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Copyright, Pandemics, and Emergencies:
When Desperate Times Dictate
Contextual Responses
Caroline L. Osborne*
ABSTRACT
This article explores fair use, the library exception, the first sale doctrine, and controlled digital lending as responses to copyright in the context
of permitting libraries to digitize materials existing exclusively in print in
their collection for use in teaching, research, and scholarship by students,
faculty, and other patrons. Also included is a decision matrix to be employed
as a tool for analysis in making the decisions as to digitization of print resources in response to instances of emergencies.
Keywords: copyright, fair use, pandemic, epidemic, emergency, state of
emergency, national emergency, obsolesce, hurricane, wildfire, flood, reproduction, distribution, controlled digital lending, CDL, library exception, first
sale doctrine, decision matrix
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INTRODUCTION
Complications arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the relevance and necessity of fair use, the first sale doctrine, controlled digital
lending, and the section 108 library exception, approaches to copyright that
librarians and others invoke routinely to ensure access to information. On
March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization Director General characterized the outbreak of COVID-19 as a pandemic.1 The response to such declaration was the disruption of life as normal with the imposition of stay-athome orders, remote work arrangements, and virtual learning for a significant portion of the global population. The direct impact on many was the loss
of access to the information they routinely relied upon in their daily work.
1.

WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at Media Briefing on COVID-19,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid19—-11-march-2020 [https://perma.cc/9WUC-VCPN] (“We have therefore
made the assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic.”).
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Librarians looked to fair use, the library exception under section 108 of the
Copyright Act, the first sale doctrine, and controlled digital lending as solutions.2 Social distancing, closure of workspaces, elimination of face-to-face
instruction in favor of online classes, and the shuttering of university campuses, including libraries, in a brief period of time and in the middle of a
semester defined day-to-day life for over a year and emphasized the barriers
disrupting access to information.3 Hurricanes like Katrina and Sandy, wildfires, and floods similarly cause the institutions we rely upon to provide the
information in support of research, teaching, and learning to close or restrict
access to their physical premises and print collections for undefined, sometimes extensive, periods of time.4
In the recent global pandemic, as everyone rushed to embrace a new
way of working and learning, the need to consider new and innovative ways
of meeting the demands of everyday life became clear. Particularly acute
questions arose around meeting the information needs of the public, students,
faculty, and researchers where access to traditional physical print collections
was eliminated and the unknowns regarding the underlying virus exceeded
the knowns. The limitations of Google quickly revealed it as a poor substitute
for the institutions of libraries and archives.5 The presence of a global pan2.

KEVIN T. RICHARDS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10453, COVID-19 AND LIBRARE-BOOKS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 3–4 (2020).

IES:

3.

See Ryan Clough, Digitization in an Emergency: Fair Use/Fair Dealing and
How Libraries Are Adapting to the Pandemic, ASS’N OF RES. LIBRS. (Apr. 1,
2020), https://www.arl.org/blog/digitization-in-an-emergency-fair-use-fairdealing-and-how-libraries-are-adapting-to-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/
DE4M-6FG9].
As of [April 1, 2020], nearly every ARL member in the United States and
Canada has closed its brick-and-mortar facilities and discontinued or severely limited access to print collections. The same is true for most other
types of libraries – both local public libraries and school libraries are
widely shut down. . . . During the shutdowns, most libraries and their users
must now go entirely online. The problem is that the digital availability of
many library holdings is not equivalent to their physical availability.
Id.

4.

Andre M. Perry, Hurricane Katrina Provides Lessons About Closing Campuses
During the Coronavirus Crisis, BROOKINGS (Mar. 16, 2020), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/03/16/the-lessons-hurricane-katrinataught-us-about-closing-campuses-in-a-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/GM2L-UQV3]
(“[I]n 2005, Hurricane Katrina forced months-long shutdowns on local college
campuses.”).

5.

Brewster Kahle, The National Emergency Library – Who Needs It? Who Reads
It? Lessons From the First Two Weeks, INTERNET ARCHIVE BLOGS (Apr. 7,
2020), http://blog.archive.org/2020/04/07/the-national-emergency-library-whoneeds-it-who-reads-it-lessons-from-the-first-two-weeks [https://perma.cc/
YH5G-GMED].
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demic presented unique challenges; however, libraries face similar questions
in the instances of flood, fire, hurricane, tornado, and other climate events
where acts of God result in restricted access to information and traditional
spaces and institutions like libraries and archives. The resulting questions of
how a library attends to its core function, providing access to information,
follow. May a library digitize all or a significant portion of a work on course
reserve or in its physical collection and make it available to students, researchers, scholars, faculty, or the public in support of teaching, research, or
scholarship when, because of an emergency, the print copy is not available
either because of a fear of contamination of the work itself or physical access
to the work is prohibited by events such as: quarantine, stay-at-home orders,
damage to infrastructure, or the like? How does a library meet the information demands of its users without violating the exclusive rights reserved to
the copyright holder in section 106 of the Copyright Act when the information is not held in a digital form and access to the print is not possible?
Section 106 of the Copyright Act reserves to the copyright holder a
series of exclusive rights.6 Those rights are:
1. The right to reproduce the copyrighted work;
2. The right to create a derivative work based on the copyrighted
work;
3. The right to distribute a copy of the work to the public by sale,
rental, lease, loan or other transfer;
4. The right to perform a literary, musical, dramatic or choreographed
work;
5. The right to perform a sound recording of a copyrighted work in
public using a digital audio transmission.7
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution directs establishment of copyright in order to “Promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.”8 The granting of these exclusive rights is the basis of a bargain struck in the Constitution providing incentives to authors to create,
publish, and disseminate their work.9 The bargain strikes a balance.10 Authors
benefit because they receive a limited monopoly on their work that provides
a reward for their labor.11 On the other side of the bargain is the benefit to the
6.

17 U.S.C. § 106.

7.

Id.

8.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

9.

MARY RASENBERGER & CHRIS WESTON, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. & NAT’L DIGIT.
INFO. INFRATRUCTURE & PRES. PROGRAM OF THE LIBR. OF CONG., THE SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP REPORT 121 (2008), https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/
cheer/campus/acrosscampus/15 [https://perma.cc/SK5R-WLS9].

10.

Id. at 9.

11.

Id. at 9 n.17.
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public.12 This bargain is reflected in the Copyright Act, with section 106
reserving limited rights to the exclusive use of the author, providing authors
the right to expect and receive a reasonable return on their labor while promoting creativity and innovation to the benefit of society.13 While arguably
frustrating to some in periods of normalcy, the question shifts in times of
extremis, resulting in seemingly insurmountable barriers to information required to function, thrive, and encourage the creativity and innovation suggested in the bargain. Or does it? Does the Copyright Act, as written, offer
solutions to navigate, albeit perhaps only on a temporary basis, the unique
needs raised in times of emergency?
This article explores the role of fair use, the library exception, the first
sale doctrine, and the theory of controlled digital lending as devices and theory to meet information needs in the event of extraordinary changes in daily
lives as asserted during times of local, regional, national, and world-wide
crisis such as a pandemic, climate-related event, or other like emergency.
Each plays a significant role in providing information to a user during times
of normalcy. In times of exigent circumstances, their importance and use is
heightened. Fair use is an affirmative defense invoked against a claim of
These exclusive rights provide incentives to authors in order to increase the publication and dissemination of intellectual works. To ensure
that the public interest in dissemination of works is best served, copyright
law also balances the exclusive rights of creators and publishers against
the interests of subsequent users and others who provide access to works
through certain exceptions and limitations on the exclusive rights . . . . The
exclusive rights incentives enable authors and publishers to invest both
time and money in the creation and publication of creative works, while
the exceptions and limitations ensure that the success of those works are
not restricted by the exclusive rights in ways that world be unreasonably
detrimental to the public interest. Depending upon where they sit in this
creative marketplace, rightsholders and libraries and archives have varying
perspectives on how to calibrate the balance so that the purposes of copyright are best achieved.
Speaking in gross generalizations, libraries and archives place primary
importance on the value of providing access to their patrons, viewing copyright issues through the lens of the public’s need for uninhibited information flow in order to fully participate in creative, intellectual, and political
life. Rights-holders, on the other hand, emphasize the value of exclusive
rights for creators, recognizing that without incentives and compensation
to creators and their publishers, the amount and quality of creative and
intellectual works available to the public will be severely diminished. Of
course, for copyright law to work optimally, the core values of dissemination to the public and incentives to create should reinforce one another, not
work at cross-purposes.
Id. at 156.
12.

Id. at 9 n.17.

13.

Id. at 62.
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copyright infringement where material under copyright is copied without the
permission of the copyright owner, traditionally in a limited manner supporting a transformative purpose.14 The first sale doctrine recognizes the right of
the purchaser of a copyrighted work to further alienate that specific copy of
the work.15 The library exception, as embedded in the Copyright Act, recognizes the routine work of libraries functioning as a limitation on the exclusive
rights granted to the copyright owner.16 Controlled digital lending is a new
and, as yet, untested theory proposed to replicate traditional print lending
with its digital equivalent.17 Part I of this Article explores the statutory devices of fair use, the library exception, the first sale doctrine, and the theory
of controlled digital lending. What is the law of copyright in the context of
responding to and providing information to users who would ordinarily walk
into a library but due to an emergency cannot? What happens in the context
of libraries providing information during an emergency where the emergency
creates a barrier preventing access to the information routinely used in education, scholarship, and research? How does one breach such a barrier to get
access to information when copyright precludes copying of information in all
but limited circumstances? Part II constructs a decision matrix that a library
or other may employ in making decisions and considers the statutory devices
of fair use, the library exception, and the first sale doctrine, as well as the
theory of controlled digital lending in the context of providing information in
exigent circumstances. Such devices and theory are considered for viability,
effectiveness, and applicability of digitization of print works, in part or
whole, for use by patrons in support of teaching, research, and scholarship to
meet the usual information needs for the temporary period of the emergency
situation to the benefit of the public.

14.

See generally More Information on Fair Use, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://
www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html (last updated May 2021) [https://
perma.cc/JJC2-AWBS].

15.

See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN
2020).

16.

See generally Revising Section 108: Copyright Exceptions for Libraries and
Archives, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section108/
[https://perma.cc/G6VN-ZBJN].

17.

See generally CONTROLLED DIGIT. LENDING BY LIBRS., https://controlleddigitallending.org [https://perma.cc/BFP8-PWNM].

ON

COPYRIGHT § 7.6.1 (3d ed.
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TWO STATUTORY DEVICES AND A THEORY – FAIR USE,
THE LIBRARY EXCEPTION, FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
AND CONTROLLED DIGITAL LENDING
Fair Use and Section 107
1.

History and Development of Fair Use in the United States

Fair use is an affirmative defense originating in caselaw and later codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act.18 The development of fair use is
described as providing an elasticity in copyright that the Supreme Court characterizes as a “guarantee of breathing space at the heart of copyright.”19 Fair
use at its heart is a balance beam that avoids rigid application of copyright in
a manner to impede the very thing, creativity and innovation, that copyright
is intended to foster. The question of balance and the related fact-based, equitable analysis is generally at the heart of a fair use analysis. What happens,
however, to that balance in the event of extraordinary circumstances?
i. Folsom v. Marsh
Folsom v. Marsh established fair use in the United States.20 The question raised in Folsom involved whether it was permissible for authors to include letters from another publication in their new publication, where 353
pages of the new work were identical copies of pages from the original
work.21 Circuit Justice Story, in writing for the court, established the doctrine
of fair use in the United States.22 Fair use is a term of art that turns an unauthorized use of copyrighted material to a permissible use.23 The dispute in
Folsom centered on use of material published in Life and Writings of George
Washington, written by Jared Sparks and published by Charles Folsom,
Wells, and Thurston.24 Marsh, Capen, and Lyon published The Life of Washington as a two-volume work that made verbatim use of letters of President
Washington taken from Plaintiff’s original twelve-volume work.25 Plaintiff’s
twelve-volume work was composed of a one-volume work on the life of
George Washington and eleven volumes compiling writings and letters of
Washington, enhanced by Sparks’ editorial notes and illustrations. Defend-

18. 2 THE LAW

OF

COPYRIGHT § 15:5 (2021).

19. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
20. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
21.

Id. at 345.

22.

Id. at 344.

23.

2 THE LAW

24.

Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345.

25.

Id.

OF

COPYRIGHT § 15:5 (2021).
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ants’ two-volume work consisted of 866 pages of which 388 were identical
to the content in plaintiff’s work.26 Story defined the issue as:
[W]hether this is a justifiable use of the original materials such as
the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the
plaintiffs. It is said that the defendant has selected only such
materials, as suited his own limited purpose as a biographer. That
is doubtless, true; and he has produced an exceedingly valuable
book. But that is no answer to the difficulty. It is certainly not
necessary, to constitute an invasion of copyright that the whole of
a work should be copied, or even a large portion of it in form or in
substance. If so much is taken, that the value of the original is
sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is
sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto. The
entirety of the copyright is the property of the author; and it is no
defense, [sic] that another person has appropriated a part, and not
the whole of any property. Neither does it necessarily depend
upon the quantity taken whether it is an infringement of the copyright or not. It is often affected by other considerations, the value
of the materials taken, and the importance of it to the sale of the
original work . . . . One writer might take all the vital part of
another’s book, though it might be but a small proportion of the
book in quantity. It is not only quantity, but value, that is always
looked to . . . . [I]n deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value
of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.27
Ultimately finding for the plaintiff, Story noted that more than one-third
of Defendants’ work was appropriated from the plaintiff.28 Critical to Story’s
decision was the appropriation of not only entire letters but also those letters
“of most interest and value to the public, as illustrating the life, the acts, and
the character of Washington.”29 Story’s decision, however, recognized instances of use by another of original material may still be justified through an
analysis of the “nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the original
work.”30 Thus, the judicial concept of fair use was born, lasting until the
26.

Id.

27.

Id. at 348.

28.

Id. at 349.

29.

Id.

30.

Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
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passage of section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act codified the concept in
statute.31
2.

17 U.S.C. §107; The Codification of Fair Use

The Copyright Act of 1976 codified the judicial doctrine of fair use.32
Passed on October 19, 1976, and effective January 1, 1978, fair use as then
codified read much as Justice Story originally described 135 years before.33
Notwithstanding the provisions [setting forth the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner] of sections 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any means specified by that section for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include –
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.34
As codified, section 107 is an “equitable rule of reason, no generally
applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be
decided on its own facts.”35 In codifying the concept of fair use, Congress
suggested the possibility of an inexhaustible supply of situations to which
fair use might apply, thus precluding an exact and inflexible statement of a
rule.36 Further, the respective House and Senate Reports suggest Congress
intended to provide the courts the flexibility to adapt fair use on a case-by-

31.

See 17 U.S.C. § 107.

32.

See id.

33.

Compare Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344, with H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, 65 (1976),
and S. REP. NO. 94–473, 61 (1975) (Section 107 is the statutory recognition of
“[t]he judicial doctrine of fair use . . . an important and well-established limit
on the exclusive right of copyright owners.”).

34. Copyrights Pub. L. No. 94–553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1511).
35.

H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, 65.

36.

Id. at 66.
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case basis and in light of an environment of rapidly changing technology.37
Section 107 was neither an expansion of or limitation on fair use but, rather,
a restatement by Congress of the then existing judicial doctrine.38 The effect
of affirming the then-existing judicial doctrine preserved validity of the existing judicial precedents as applicable authority.39 Similarly, the statement
asserting as the will of Congress that the courts continue to adapt the doctrine
of fair use is an effective endorsement that fair use will continue to evolve
based on the facts of the matter as applied to the law.40
Pursuant to section 107, a party invoking the affirmative defense of fair
use shall consider four factors in an analysis to determine if a use is fair.41
Regardless of the mandate to consider the four statutory factors, fair use remains an equitable rule with no generally applicable definition that results in
each case decided on the basis of its own facts.42 Caselaw is instructive in
understanding when a use is fair or not. Specifically, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,43 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,44 Campbell v. Acuff Rose,45 and, most recently, the 2021 decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.46 are instructive on the fair use
calculation.
3.

The Fair Use Factor Analysis

The preamble to section 107 identifies an illustrative list of uses that are
likely to be considered fair use.47 Such permissible uses include criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.48 The intentional use of the language “such as” in the preamble makes it clear the list is
not exhaustive and expands beyond those six stated uses.49 Similarly, the four
factors in the statute are not exhaustive and may include other factors, as
37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
42.

2 THE LAW

43.

See Harper & Row, Publishers., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540–41
(1985).

44.

See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455–56 (1984).

45.

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571–572 (1994).

46.

See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2021).

OF

COPYRIGHT § 15:6 (2021).

47. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
48.

Id.

49.

Id.
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suggested by the use of the language shall include.50 While other factors may
be considered, a minimum of the four factors listed in the statute must be
considered.51 The four factors that must be considered and balanced by a
court are: (1) purpose and character of the use;52 (2) nature of the copyrighted
work;53 (3) amount and substantiality;54 and (4) market effect.55
The purpose and character factor analysis considers how a defendant
uses copyrighted material.56 Analysis of the second factor, nature of the
work, employs a spectrum of the expressive nature of the content, where
content that consists primarily of facts is generally most likely to be considered a fair use, and a work that is unique or highly creative is generally an
infringing use.57 The third factor asks the court to look at the amount and
substantiality of the copyrighted material used in the allegedly infringing
product.58 Again, on a continuum, the greater the amount used, the less likely
a use constitutes fair use.59 The amount, however, is not always determinative.60 Even a small proportion of material may be an infringing use, if the
infringing material is the heart of the original work.61 The final or fourth
factor considered by a court is market effect.62 The greater the likelihood of a
negative impact on the market for the material, the more likely the use is
infringing and not fair.63
4.

A Story of Four Cases
i. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., better known as
the Betamax case, asked if the recording of a television program on a video
50.

Id.; see Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(discussing bad faith as a factor in a fair use analysis where permission was
repeatedly sought and denied).

51. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
52. § 107(1).
53. § 107(2).
54. § 107(3).
55. § 107(4).
56. § 107(1).
57. § 107(2).
58. § 107(3).
59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540–41
(1985).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
63.

Id.
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cassette for later use was an infringement of a copyright owner’s right.64 Best
known for introducing the concept of time shifting, through use of home recording on video cassette recorders to view materials at a time convenient to
the user, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the idea that copyright does not
accord a copyright owner absolute control over all possible uses of their
work but rather grants a set of exclusive rights to use and authorize the use of
a work.65 Key to the fair use analysis were the four statutory factors, with the
Court noting the significant likelihood that a substantial number of copyright
owners would not object to time-shifting by a private viewer and the absence
of significant market harm to a copyrighted work due to time-shifting.66
ii. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, a 1985 U.S.
Supreme Court decision, the Court explored the question of the use of 300 to
400 words of verbatim quotes of protected expression from a yet to be published manuscript of President Gerald Ford.67 Justice O’Connor, writing for
the majority, stated the question before the Court as “to what extent the ‘fair
use’ provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 . . . sanctions the unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure’s unpublished manuscript.”68
The unique facts involved a former United States president, a national scandal, an unpublished manuscript, a news event, the right of first publication, a
contract with a national magazine for the exclusive pre-publication right that
was ultimately rescinded, and an unauthorized receipt of a copy of the manuscript and publication of the most interesting part or heart of the manuscript
by a rival magazine in a manner designed to scoop the story.69
The Court noted that fair use is defined as “a privilege in others than the
owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent.”70 Also confirmed was the intent of Congress to
codify the common-law doctrine of fair use in section 107 of title 17, which
mandates consideration of four nonexclusive factors.71 Significantly, the
Court found that the four-factor fair use analysis “must always be tailored to
the individual case.”72 Engaging in a detailed analysis of the four factors of
purpose and character of the use, nature of the copyrighted work, substantiality of the portion used in relation to the entirety of the copyrighted work, and
64. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457 (1984).
65. Id. at 432.
66. Id. at 446.
67. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
68. Id. at 541–42.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 549.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 552.
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market effect, the majority determined the use not to be fair, stating that
publication of the heart of an unpublished work in a manner intended to
supplant a copyright holder’s commercially valuable right of first publication
is not fair use.73
Key to the outcome of the four-factor analysis, although alone not determinative, were the following facts: (1) the work was unpublished and the
associated right to control was the right of first publication; (2) though insubstantial in amount, the 300 to 400 words used amounted to the heart of the
work; (3) the commercial use of the copyrighted material; and (4) the cancellation of the planned prepublication serialization and refusal to pay the
agreed upon funds for the serialization, thus diminishing the market for the
copyrighted work.74 Evaluating these factors, the Court determined that the
purpose and character factor did not support a finding of fair use;75 the act of
depriving a copyright holder of the right to first publication was not fair and
the publication of the heart of the work was not incidental but in fact supplanted the commercially valuable right of first publication.76 Secondly, the
Court found the factor of nature of use weighed against a finding of fair use
as the piece used more than mere facts or isolated phrases, but instead used
“excerpted subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures whose
power lies in the author’s individualized expression.”77 Thirdly, the factor of
amount used weighed against a finding of fair use as, though the amount was
small, the expression was significant or the heart of the work.78 Fourthly and
finally, the factor of market effect weighed against a finding of fair use as
there was demonstrable harm to the market for the work with the cancellation
of a contract and refusal to honor the agreed upon payment for the work.79
iii. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., the concept of commercial use of
a significant part of a work in a commercial parody as a fair use was sanctioned.80 2 Live Crew, a rap music group, composed the song Pretty Woman
as a parody of Roy Orbison’s ballad, Oh, Pretty Woman.81 2 Live Crew’s
request for a license for Oh, Pretty Woman was declined and 2 Live Crew

73.

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560–65.

74.

Id. at 539.

75.

Id. at 561–62.

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 563.

78.

Id. at 564–66.

79.

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567.

80. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
81.

Id. at 572.
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proceeded with their creation of the parody.82 Infringement litigation followed with assertion of fair use as a defense. Justice Souter, writing for the
majority, concluded that a commercial parody may constitute fair use.83 Examining both Story’s analysis in Folsom v. Marsh and the codification of fair
use in section 107 of the Copyright Act, the Court affirmed that each of the
four statutory factors must be applied to each claim of fair use and analyzed
on a case-by-case basis.84
Most instructive is the discussion regarding the first factor of the fair
use analysis, purpose and character. The transformative nature of use of the
work is key.85 The more transformative the new work, the less significance
accorded the other factors.86 The commercial nature of the work is but one
factor of the purpose and character analysis, affirming the Sony decision.87
The decision also noted the diminished importance of the nature of the copyrighted work factor, factor two, as “the artistic value of parodies is often
found in their ability to invariably copy popular works of the past.”88
In examining the third factor, the amount and substantiality, the Court
found the amount used by 2 Live Crew was reasonable in light of the purpose
to create a parody, even if it was the heart of the work.89 In examining the
fourth and final factor, market effect, the Court concluded that the nature of a
parody is such that it is an unlikely substitute for the original and will serve a
different market, thus not diminishing the original market.90
iv. Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.
Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., decided in April 2021, is the most
recent U.S. Supreme Court discussion of the fair use factors.91 In a six to two
decision,92 Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion, concluding that the
copying of the JAVA API declaring code or naming convention was fair
use.93 At issue was Google’s copying of thirty-seven packages of Java pro82.

Id. at 572–73.

83.

Id. at 594.

84.

Id. at 576–78.

85.

Id. at 579.

86.

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.

87.

Id. at 583–84.

88.

Id. at 586.

89.

Id. at 589.

90.

Id.

91. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1196–97 (2021).
92.

Id. at 1189 (noting Justice Barrett did not participate in the decision).

93.

Id. at 1190.
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gramming language for use in their Android platform.94 Google copied the
portion of the Java API that allowed Java programmers to use the task calling
system they knew; three of which were fundamental to use of the Java language.95 Affirming fair use as an “ ‘equitable rule of reason’ that ‘permits
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which the law is designed to foster[,]’’ the
Court began an analysis of the application of fair use.96 Describing the four
factors of fair use as “general principles, the application of which requires
judicial balancing, depending upon relevant circumstances, including ‘significant changes in technology[,]’ ” the Court reconsidered the four statutory
factors.97 Dismissing the question of the underlying copyright status of the
material and summarily concluding that the code was copyrighted material,
the Court dispensed with that portion of the case.98
Conducting the fair use analysis, the Court rescued factor two, the nature of the copyrighted work, from the obscurity where it languished postCampbell.99 Beginning with the second factor, nature of the work, the Court
characterized the declaring code as embodying a “different kind of creativity,” in this instance names that are intuitively easy to remember.100 In acceptance of this factor, the Court concluded that the “nature of the
copyrighted work” inclined towards fair use.101 Often described as a transformative use, here the Court stated that in examination of the concept of
transformative use, there is a more exacting examination of “purpose and
character” of use.102 This suggests that there is a need to recognize that some
94.

Id. at 1193.

95.

Id. at 1193–94.

96.

Id. at 1196 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).

97.

Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1196.

98.

Id. at 1190.

99.

Id. at 1201.

100. Id. at 1202.
They wanted to attract programmers who would learn the system, help to
develop it further, and provide reluctant to use another. . . (“Declaring
code is user facing. It must be designed and organized in a way that is
intuitive and understandable to developers so that they can invoke it.”) . . .
Unlike many other programs, its value in significant part derives from the
value that those who do not hold copyrights, namely, computer programmers, invest of their own time and effort to learn the API’s system. And
unlike many other programs, its value lies in its efforts to encourage programmers to lean and to use the system they will use (and continue to
use).
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1203.
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works are closer to the core of copyright than others.103 In the view of the
Court, the declaring code, if copyrightable at all, is further from the core of
copyright than other types of code, such as implementing code.104 A determination of whether or not a use is transformative requires examination of the
“copying’s more specifically described ‘purpose[s]’ and ‘character.’ ”105 In
this instance, the use of the copied code was in the creation of a new product
that offers a “highly creative and innovative tool for a smartphone environment.”106 Use of the Java API to create a new platform is “consistent with the
creative ‘progress’ that is the basic Constitutional objective of copyright.”107
The Court viewed the purpose and character of Google’s copying as a transformative use that inclines to fair use.108
In analysis of the first factor, “purpose and character of the use,” the
question considered was if the “copier’s use ‘adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering’ the copyrighted work ‘with
new expression, meaning, or message.’ ”109 Analysis of if a use is transformative requires a precise focus on the specific purpose and character of the
copying.110 In Google, the specific use was the creation of a new product that
offered a “highly creative and innovative tool for the smartphone environment.”111 This use was found to be both transformative and creative,112 with
the Court noting creativity is the principle objective stated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.113 Of importance was the limited use of the copying, since Google only took the minimal amount needed to develop the new
platform.114 The action was defined as “reimplementation[,]” “building of a
system . . . that repurposes the same words and syntaxes of an existing system — in this case so that programmers who had learned an existing system
could put their basic skills to use in a new one.”115 The significance of this
103. See Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1203.
104. Id. at 1202 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
105. Id. at 1203.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1202.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1203.
112. Id.
113. Id.; See also Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co, 499 U.S. 340, 349–350
(“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors but
‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (quoting U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
114. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1204.
115. Id. at 1203.
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reimplementation was such that the Court was convinced that the purpose
and character of the use, factor one, was transformative and inclined to fair
use.116
Google also explored the concepts of commercial purpose and good
faith in the context of the first factor, noting that these are traditional factors
in examination of purpose and character.117 Teaching and scholarship are the
traditional examples of accepted copying.118 Non-commercial uses are ones
that tend to tip the analysis in favor of fair use.119 The converse is not always
true. Just because a use is commercial does not result in a de facto determination that the use is not fair.120 The fact that a use is commercial is not dispositive for the purpose and character, especially where the use is a
transformative one.121
What is the role of good or bad faith in the analysis of the first factor?
Campbell initially raised the question of whether or not bad faith is part of
the fair use first factor analysis.122 Google acknowledged the skepticism of
the Campbell decision regarding if bad faith is an appropriate factor for consideration.123 The Court declined to opine as to if it were helpful to consider
instances of good or bad faith, noting that it was not determinative in the
context of Google.124
The third factor of the fair use analysis is amount and substantiality.
How does one characterize amount copied? In Google, the question framed
was—is the amount virtually all of the declaring code, thirty-seven packages,
or the entirety of the Java API?125 Framing of this question is significant, as
virtually all of the declaring code was copied but the declaring code was only
a small portion of the entire Java API.126 Campbell and Harper & Row suggest parameters. In Harper & Row, taking the heart of a work, even where
the amount is small, was too much.127 In Campbell, taking a larger amount
may be fair where the material taken is central to a valid purpose of the
116. Id. at 1204.
117. See id. at 1201.
118. Id. at 1204.
119. Id.
120. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1204.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1204–05.
126. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1205.
127. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–565
(1985).
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copier.128 The dividing line for substantiality points to fair use when “the
amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative purpose.”129
Market effect is the fourth factor of consideration in a fair use statutory
analysis. The analysis focuses upon the impact or effect of the copying on the
market value for the original work.130 The economic injury to the copyright
owner is the singular focus of market effect, with the question of whether the
market for the original work is negatively impacted because the new work
acts as a substitute for the original.131 Traditionally, the focus is on a diminution in value of the market for the original work or whether or not the new
work acts as a substitute for the original.132 In Google, the Court concluded
that loss of or potential loss of revenue is an incomplete story.133 The complete story to be told looks at the “source of the loss” and the benefit the
public receives due to the copying.134 The benefit to the public analysis suggests we consider the following two non-exclusive questions:
Is the benefit related to the creative production of new expression?
Are the benefits important or unimportant when compared to the likely
amount of the loss when considering the nature of the source of the loss?135
In weighing the facts, including the “risks of creativity-related harms to
the public,” the conclusion for market effect weighed for Google.136 The resulting comprehensive and detailed analysis of each of the four statutory factors concluded with each factor inclined towards Google and a finding that
Google’s use of the thirty-seven packets was a fair use.137
B.

Obsolescence and Section 108; The Library Exception
1.

The Library and Archive Exception; Section 108

The growing roles of the modern library in preserving knowledge, written works, and materials and ensuring access to information for communities
large and small for the purposes of education, research, and acquisition of

128. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).
129. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1205.
130. Id. at 1206.
131. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2014); see also
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (limiting market harm to market substitution).
132. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1206.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1208.
137. Id. at 1209.
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knowledge in all forms is long-established and well understood.138 The library and archival exception as codified in section 108 of the Copyright Act
permits libraries and archives to make copies of items found in their collections for the purposes of preservation and repair.139 The U.S. Copyright Office acknowledges that libraries are so “[central] to the diffusion of
knowledge that libraries and archives currently enjoy an exception in the
copyright law.”140 Section 108 “is a recognition that regular and frequent
reproduction and distribution of creative works is vital to the mission of libraries and archives.”141 Section 108 creates a limit on infringement by providing that no copyright infringement occurs when a library or archive makes
a copy pursuant to and in compliance with provisions outlined.142 Section
108 is intended to provide “library-like institutions with a useful, clear, and
unambiguous exception that practicing librarians can employ to make decisions about use of copyrighted works in recurring library situations.”143 Section 108 represents Congress’ vision of a scale balancing the need to
incentivize creativity and innovation per the Constitution on one side and
access to information and the rights of libraries and their users on the
other.144
Libraries that seek a section 108 exception for copying traditionally
must satisfy four general qualifications:145
138. See Karyn Temple Claggett & Chris Weston, Preserving the Viability of Specific Exceptions for Libraries and Archives in the Digital Age, 13 J.L. & POL’Y
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 67, 68 (2016).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
140. Claggett & Weston, supra note 138, at 68.
141. Id.
142. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
143. David R. Hansen, Copyright Reform Principles for Libraries, Archives, and
Other Memory Institutions, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1559, 1563 (2014).
144. LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 5:48 (2021).
145. The Warnings of Copyright for Use By Certain Libraries and Archives states:
The copyright law of the United States (title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives
are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these
specific conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used
for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a
user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for
purposes in excess of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright
infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if , in its judgment fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.
Warnings of Copyright for Use by Certain Libraries and Archives, 37 C.F.R.
§ 201.14(b) (2020). [the text on this row seemed grey not black]
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1.
2.

The institution is a permissible institution, a library or archive.146
Distribution of the created copy serves neither a direct or indirect
purpose of a commercial advantage.147
3. The library or archive is open to the public or researchers in specialized fields.148
4. Any copy created includes a notice of copyright.149
Section 108 is narrowly constructed to permit the specific, traditional, and
customary library activities of preservation and lending.150 The section applies to specific types of libraries meeting the specific characteristics identified in section 108(a) without defining either library or archive.151 The
statutory requirements that permit use of the exception for permissible institutions (libraries and archives) are:
1. the copy is made by a library or archive or an employee of a library
or archive acting within the scope of their employment;
2. creation of a single copy or phonorecord, except as otherwise provided by the statute; and
3. distribution consistent with the other requirements of § 108.152
Qualifying as a permissible institution is key, as certain commercial activities
are beyond the scope of section 108 protection.153

146. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a).
147. § 108(a)(1); see Rasenberger & Weston, supra note 9, at 25 (stating that commercial advantage is viewed within the concept of the reproduction not the
nature of the institution).
148. § 108(a)(2).
149. § 108(a)(3).
150. See id. § 108(a)(1)-(3). The four requirements for reproduction and distribution
by a library or archive are:
1. authorization is “to reproduce no more than one copy or phonorecord of
a work,”
2. the library or archive may not engage in the distribution of copies or
phonorecords for “any purpose of direct or indirect commercial
advantage,”
3. the library or archives must be open to the public or to researchers in
specialized field, and
4. any reproduction or distribution of a work under 108 must include a
notice of copyright.
Id.
151. § 108(a).
152. Id.
153. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 503 n.12 (2001) (discussing forprofit subscription electronic databases or “electronic libraries” ineligible for
section 108 protection for reproductions included in databases).
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Additional requirements related to lending and preservation or replacement are included in section 108 (b) through (i):154
1. Section 108(b) — reproduction and distribution of unpublished
works for preservation;155
2. Section 108(c) — creation of a replacement copy of a published
work for use on the library premises where the original copy is
damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if the existing format is
obsolete but only after the library attempts to obtain a copy at a fair
price;156
3. Section 108(d) — permission to copy for research and scholarship
and inclusion of notice of copyright where the copy becomes the
property of the user and the library prominently displays a notice of
copyright;157
4. Section 108(e) — permission to reproduce an entire work subject to
the requirement of determination that a copy may not be obtained at
a reasonable price and the requirements of § 108(d) are met;158
5. Section 108(f) — limitations on liabilities for reproductions made
pursuant to the requirements of 108;159
6. Section 108(g) — limitation of 108 to isolated and unrelated reproductions of a single copy of the same or separate occasions;160
7. Section 108(h) —reproduction during the final twenty years of a
work’s copyright term; and161
8. Section 108(i) — excludes from section 108 reproduction and distribution of musical works, pictorial, graphic or sculptural work, or
a motion picture or other audiovisual work excluding news. Illustrations and the like published as part of the article are covered by the
statutory exception.162
In the traditional sense, section 108 permits libraries to go about the
routine business of providing information to users.163 The intersection of library collections and the democratization of access to information in a digital
era is central to the missions of libraries and archives, making section 108
154. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
155. § 108(b).
156. § 108(c).
157. § 108(d).
158. § 108(e).
159. § 108(f).
160. § 108(g).
161. § 108(h).
162. § 108(i).
163. See id. § 108.
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key to providing library services and access to information.164 In times of
normal operation, libraries, archives, and cultural memory institutions seek to
preserve and provide access to information and support research.165 Digitization of information expands the reach of the library collection, serving those
with information needs beyond the physical reach of the library. In a discussion of reform of section 108, the then Register of Copyright referenced the
continuing need for the balance section 108 provides and supported amendment of section 108 to permit libraries, archives, and museums to make and
distribute copies in a manner that did not “unduly harm the valid interests of
rights holders.”166 In times of a national emergency, the relevant questions
are: What is routine, and how might a library provide information to its
users?
The compromising spirit of section 108 suggests maintaining a balance
is critical. Vice President and University Librarian for Columbia University,
James G. Neal’s statement before the Committee on House Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet is informative.
Mr. Neal characterizes the library exception codified in section 108 as supplemental to versus supplanting fair use in the context of important library
services such as preservation.167 When considering whether amendments to
the existing statutory framework were needed, he testified that the existing
framework combining the library exception in section 108 with the flexible
framework of fair use found in section 107 works well and needs no amendment.168 Libraries spend in excess of four billion annually on the acquisition
of books and other information with the goal of access to and preservation of
information as a public benefit.169 The most recent statistics on acquisitions
by academic libraries indicate sixty percent of materials expenditures are for
licensed and purchased electronic resources at an estimated cost of 1.6 billion
dollars.170 Inherent in the preservation mission of libraries is the prevention
of the loss of cultural, historical, and scholarly resources.171 He also recog164. See Hansen, supra note 143, at 1576.
165. Id.
166. Maria Pallente, Session 1: The Legal Landscape, 36 COLUM J. L. &. ARTS 527,
529 (2013).
167. Preservation and Reuse of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on Preservation and
Reuse of Copyrighted Works Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop. and the
Internet of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 32 (2014) [hereinafter
Testimony of Neal] (testimony of James G. Neal, Vice President for Info. Servs.
and Univ. Libr., Columbia Univ.).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Institution of Education Sciences, Academic Libraries: 2012, 12 (2014), https://
nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014038.pdf.
171. Testimony of Neal, supra note 167, at 32.
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nized the constant change and continuing evolution of the nature of a library
collection, consistent with new technologies.172
The beauty of section 108 is its consistency and simplicity. Librarians
may provide traditional library services without fear of running afoul of copyright or the constant need for legal advice.173
Paper-based books and manuscripts have been the mainstay of
scholarly communications and library collections for hundreds of
years. But in less than two decades, digital information has become integral to research in all disciplines and to the public. . . .Rapidly [digitized] media are forming a substantial part of
our cultural record. . . . Websites come and go, documents disappear from websites, hyperlinks get broken, files become corrupted
and storage media become obsolete.174
But what are the boundaries of that balance in exigent circumstances?
Can a library digitize all or a significant portion of a work on course reserve
and make the digital copy available to students when the presence of an
emergency prohibits or restricts access to print due to contamination, quarantine, shelter in place orders, or the like? A clue to the answer lies in section
108(e) that permits copying of an entire or substantial portion of a work for
the purposes of “private study scholarship or research.”175 It may be asserted
that the section 108 requirement that the library previously determine that a
copy cannot be obtained at a fair price is satisfied in a time of exigency when
the usual business options are disrupted by the same exigent circumstances.
The legislative history on section 108 is instructive here. North Carolina
Representative Coble’s material in extension of remarks not spoken by a
member on the floor shares the following:
In addition to all of the foregoing, there are a number of amendments that were made in the Senate bill that will be included . . . .
These include: an expansion of the exemptions for nonprofit libraries and archives in 17 U.S.C. s108 to cover the making of
digital copies without authorization, for the purposes of preservation, security or replacement of damaged, lost or stolen copies; an
expansion of section 108 to cover the making of digital copies
without authorization in order to replace copies in the collection
that are in an obsolete format. . . [A] provision directing the Register of Copyrights to consult with nonprofit libraries and non-

172. Id.
173. Hansen, supra note 143, at 1564.
174. See id.
175. 17 U.S.C. § 108(e).
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profit educational institutions and submit recommendations on
how to promote distance education through digital technologies.176
Mr. Neal’s testimony is similarly instructive, suggesting Congress enacted
section 108 with the specific intent to provide a clear exception to libraries
for the reproduction of published works for the purpose of replacing a copy
that was damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen.177 Neal’s testimony also affirms that section 108(f)(4) does not act as a limitation on a library’s assertion of fair use.178 Sections 108 and 107 work together to foster the important
work of libraries. Section 108 provides certainty for activities falling into the
specific library exception, bypassing the need for the laborious fair use analysis.179 Section 107 is another avenue that permits reproduction beyond the
108 exception if the statutory four factor analysis is met.180 The two provisions effectively work in tandem to provide space for the meaningful work of
libraries.
Mr. Neal is also helpful on the question of the replacement copy authorized under 108(c).181
Congress indicated that there is a strong public policy interest in
libraries making replacement copies. Accordingly, when a library
makes a replacement copy that exceeds the specific provisions of
108(c) . . . a court should give great weight to Congress’s recognition of the public policy interest in replacement copies when assessing the first fair use factor: the purposes and character of the
use . . . [t]o be sure, this “substantial compliance” with section 108

176. 144 CONG. REC. E1207–08 (1998).
177. Testimony of Neal, supra note 167, at 33. See also Authors Guild v. Hathitrust,
755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting a narrow interpretation of 108); H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1476 at 78–79 (1976) (“Nothing in section 108 impairs the applicability of the fair use doctrine to a wide variety of situations involving photocopying or other reproductions by a library of the copyrighted material in its
collections, where the user requests the reproduction for legitimate scholarly or
research purposes.”).
178. Testimony of Neal, supra note 167, at 33. See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at
74 (1976) (“[T]he language of section 108(f)(4). . .”[N]o provision of section
108 is intended to take away any rights existing under the fair use doctrine.”).
179. Testimony of Neal, supra note 167, at 33.
180. Id.
181. Preservation and Reuse of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on Preservation and
Reuse of Copyrighted Works Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop. and the
Internet of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 43 (2014) [hereinafter
Statement of Neal] (statement of James G. Neal, Vice President for Info. Servs.
and Univ. Libr., Columbia Univ.).
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is not outcome determinative. It simply tilts the first factor analysis in favor of the library.182
2.

The Meaning of Obsolete

Focusing on section 108(c) permitting the creation of a copy of a published work183 for use in the library premises in the event a work is lost or
held in an obsolete format, the question becomes: What is obsolete? Obsolete
is defined as “[when] the machine or device necessary to render perceptible a
work stored in that format is no longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace.”184 The term obsolete first appears in section 108 in S 2037 introduced on May 6, 1998.185 The term was
subsequently adopted in the related House Bill.186 The previous year, speaking before Congress, Senator Ashcroft noted the purpose of the amendment
to section 108 was, in part, to “facilitate the preservation of copyrighted
materials by libraries, archives and universities as those institutions represent
the cultural heritage of the United States in the best means possible, including digitally.”187 The intent of the legislation, as expressed by Senator Ashcroft, was to “unlock the teaching potential of the internet and guarantee that
the appropriate material is made available, so . . . students can receive a full
education while taking advantage of the tremendous strides made in technology.”188 Senator Ashcroft’s remarks suggest that the omission of the term
“obsolete” and the corresponding “obsolete” provisions would hinder libraries, archives, and universities in the preservation of their works and the loss
of billions of dollars of content if format-shifting was not permitted.189
Section 108(c) contains parameters for creating replacement copies, but
the language of the statute omits critical definitions. For example, damaged
and deteriorating are not defined and left to the subjective.190 Absent a controlling definition of the terms, when is a format deteriorating or damaged?
182. Id.
183. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c). It is important to highlight that 17 U.S.C. § 108 distinguishes between published and unpublished works. See id. § 108. For example,
the provisions of § 108(b) apply exclusively to unpublished works. Id.
§ 108(b).
184. § 108(c).
185. S. 2037, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998).
186. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998).
187. 143 CONG. REC. S8723, S8729 (1997).
188. Id. at S8729–30.
189. Id. at S8729.
190. Howard Besser et al., Video at Risk: Strategies for Preserving Commercial
Video Collections in Libraries, N.Y. UNIV. LIBRS. 4 (Dec. 2012), https://
guides.nyu.edu/ld.php?content_id=24818036 [https://perma.cc/96R7-G8GR].
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Guideline 1 from the Video At Risk (“VAR”) 108 Study Group suggests a
work is damaged or deteriorating “if it cannot be viewed in substantially its
original condition.”191 VAR also suggests that it is the individual library that
is to make the assessment regarding format, because “the purpose of [section
108(c)] is to allow libraries to replace copies in their collections” that are
becoming unusable, thus, where copies are still performing as designed and
intended, the statutory justification for invoking section 108(c) is more difficult to assert.192 The 108 study group also observed that assessment for deterioration or damage is context-dependent.193 The VAR study and resulting
report focuses on video and the natural deterioration and loss of information;
however, the general principles provide guidance as to how section 108 is
intended to work.194 Context is one element a library must consider in its
assessment before invoking section 108 to permit the replacement copy.195
Additional guidance suggests that a preemptive copy is impermissible.196
Guideline 3 of the VAR study addresses the concept of suitable replacements.197 The guideline states: “[u]nder §108(c) a suitable ‘replacement’ is a
copy that can serve the same educational and scholarly purposes as the original, meaning it contains materially the same content and is equally easy for
patrons to access and use.”198 This suggests that the determination of what
qualifies as an acceptable replacement must ask if the suggested copy “could
serve the same scholarly or educational purpose as the original.”199
3.

DMCA and Access to Information; Impact on the Library
and Archive Section 108 Exception

Effective November 29, 1999, through an amendment to the Copyright
Act, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), a right of access was
added to the list of exclusive rights of the copyright owner, supplementing
those conferred in section 106.200 Under the provisions of the DMCA, copyright owners may assert anti-circumvention protections and, correspondingly,
control access to their underlying work.201 Prior to enacting the DMCA, users
191. Id. at 5 n.5.
192. Id. at 15 n.16.
193. Id. at 6.
194. See id. at 4.
195. Id. at 6.
196. Besser, supra note 190, at 7.
197. Id. at 10.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 11.
200. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 1201.
201. Laura N. Gasaway, The New Access Right and Its Impact on Libraries and
Library Users, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 269 (2003).
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had multiple ways of accessing information. Direct purchase and borrowing
from a library were the primary modes, with licensing of digital materials
emerging as a prevalent option.202 Defining access to information becomes
key. One definition of the right of access is:
[p]ermission for a subject to access a particular object for a specific type of operation. An example of an access right is the permission for a process to read a file but not write to it.’ It is also
‘the right to control the manner in which members of the public
apprehend the work.203
The right of access is important to libraries as providing access to information is central to the core mission of a library.204 Restrictions on and control
of access run counter to this mission and the services libraries provide for the
public benefit. The addition of section 1201 with enactment of the DMCA
provides a different meaning to right of access, preferring the right of the
copyright holder to control access and use of their work over the right of the
public to obtain access to a work.205 This new definition of right of access is
at odds with the bargain implicit in the Constitution granting to the creator of
a work a set of exclusive rights in exchange for an implied right of access by
the public.206 The Association of Research Libraries Declaration of Keystone
Principles goes as far as to identify access to information as a public good.207
As discussed above, section 108 contains the library exception that permits reproduction of works under specified circumstances.208 The DMCA
amended the preservation construct of section 108 in the following manner:
1. requiring the copy to include a notice of copyright on the face of the
copy or a legend stating that the work may be protected by copyright under § 108(a)(3);209
202. Id.
203. Id. at 270.
204. Id. at 270–71 (“For years, librarians have championed the public’s right of
access to government information.”).
205. Id. at 271.
206. Id. at 271–72. See also LYMAN RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG,
THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 47–52 (1991).
207. See Marianne Gaunt, The Keystone Principles, 61 COLL. & RSCH. LIBRS. NEWS
103 (2000).
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 108.
209. 37 C.F.R. § 201.14(c)(2) (2021) states:
An Order Warning of Copyright shall be printed within a box located
prominently on the order for itself, either on the front side of the form or
immediately adjacent to the space calling for the name or signature of the
person using the form. The notice shall be printed in type and size no
smaller than that used predominantly throughout the form, and in no case
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2.

increasing the number of preservation copies permitted under
§ 108(b) from one to three;
3. eliminating the word “facsimile” from § 108; and
4. permitting a digital copy.210
Of greater significance is the DMCA’s impact on the library exception
as a whole and on how a copy might be used. The DMCA’s amendment is
more restrictive with regard to unpublished works, restricting use of the digital copy for interlibrary loan and requiring use of the digital preservation
copy211 on the physical premises of the library.212 The DMCA also amended
the replacement section of section 108(c) with regard to published works to
include the language “or if the existing format in which the work is stored
has become obsolete,” with language as to when a format is obsolete.213 The
amendment added a requirement that the library engage in reasonable investigation to locate a replacement copy at a fair price, but what if the format of
the replacement copy is the same obsolete format as the one the library seeks
to replace?214 If the only replacement copy is in the same obsolete format,
does one have to purchase the obsolete copy? Experts recognize the fallacy
this presents as the replacement copy also would be unusable.
Section 108(c) permits digital replacement copies subject to limitations
on distribution to the public.215 Section 108(c) contemplates circulation in the
same manner as the original of reproduction copies made pursuant to such
provision, excluding digital copies.216 Distribution of the digital copy, regardless of if the original is published or unpublished, is limited to the public on

210.
211.

212.
213.
214.

215.
216.

shall the type size be smaller than eight points. The notice shall be printed
in such manner as to be clearly legible, comprehensible and readily apparent to a casual reader of the form.
Id.
Laura N. Gasaway, America’s Cultural Record a Thing of the Past, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 643, 652–53 (2003).
See generally Gasaway, supra note 201, at 654 (“Digital versions of analog
works are defined as: “electronic photographs scanned from original documents. A digital image can accurately render the information, layout, and preservation of the original including typefaces, annotations, and illustrations.”).
Id. (noting that 17 U.S.C. § 108(c)(2) restricts use of a digital copy of a published work on the library premises).
Id. at 657.
See Notice to Libraries and Archives of Normal Commercial Exploitation or
Availability at Reasonable Price, 63 Fed. Reg. 71,785 (proposed Dec. 30,
1998) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
See 17 U.S.C. § 108(c).
Compare § 108(c) (stating the language of 108(c) refers to the “right of reproduction,” which is a departure from other parts of § 108 which address both the
right of reproductions and the right of distribution by libraries), with § 108(b),
and § 108(d)-(e).
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library premises.217 But VAR Guideline 5 suggests that such restriction does
not preclude making such digital copy available to a “faculty member or
other designated patron for off-premise use, such as personal study or classroom viewing.”218 Consideration of the term public in such circumstances is
key. VAR Guideline 5 suggests,
§108(c) should not be read as a total ban on off-premises use of
digital copies – instead, just a ban on making such copies available “to the public” off-premises. For example, students in a class,
watching a digital §108(c) copy of a film their professor obtained
from the library, would not likely be considered “the public” for
statutory purposes, nor would the showing of the film be considered “making available” of that digital copy to anyone, let alone
the public.219
Following the VAR Guideline 5 recommendation, “the smaller the number of
faculty members and other designated parties with off-premises clearance,
and the more tightly restricted such users are as to the purpose for which they
may use the digital copies, the fairer the library’s position.”220 Additionally,
recommended is written documentation of the policy of limitations and restrictions, consistency of application of the policy, restrictions on use by
those outside the institution, and withdrawal of the original copy from the
collection to maintain the same number of copies.221
C.

The Right of Distribution and the First Sale Doctrine; Section 109
1.

The First Sale Doctrine

The right to control the initial distribution of a work to the public by any
of sale, gift, loan, or lease is conferred as one of the section 106 exclusive
rights bestowed upon the copyright holder.222 The concept of a transfer lies at
the heart of the concept of distribution. In Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints, the court signaled a break with the long-standing premise that for the distribution right to be infringed there must be a physical
distribution of the copy, noting that a library distributes a work when it cata-

217. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(b)(2), 108(c)(2) (It is important to highlight that 17 U.S.C.
§ 108 distinguishes between published and unpublished works. For example,
the provisions of §108(c) apply exclusively to published works.).
218. Besser, supra note 190, at 15.
219. Id. at 16; see also id. at 15–16, n.17–18 (therein regarding “public”).
220. Id. at 17.
221. Id. (noting that the statute does not address downloading or streaming of a
replacement copy).
222. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
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logs the item and makes it available to the public.223 This begs the question of
the digital copy. London-Sire Records Inc., v. Doe, a peer-to-peer file sharing
case, attempted to address the question of if actual distribution of a physical
object is required by section 106(3).224 Noting that the issue before the court
was the electronic distribution of a sound recording and any object in which a
sound recording might be fixed is a material object, the judge concluded that
“there is no reason to limit ‘distribution’ to processes in which a material
object exists throughout the entire transaction—as opposed to a transaction in
which a material object is created elsewhere at its finish.”225
The first sale doctrine creates a significant limitation on the section
106(3) right of distribution.226 The first sale doctrine, as codified in section
109 of the Copyright Act, states:
[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.227
The requirements of section 109 are straightforward, creating a twoprong test for eligibility: the copy must be lawfully made and the transferor
must be the owner of that copy.228 If these threshold requirements are met,
the copy may be alienated without the permission of the holder of the copyright.229 Thus, the owner of a lawfully made copy may sell or otherwise dispose of his copy as it is exempt from copyright.
223. Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 201 (4th
Cir. 1997).
224. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 (D. Mass 2008).
225. Id. at 173.
226. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976) states:
Section 109(a) restates and confirms the principle that, where the copyright owner has transferred ownership of a particular copy or phonorecord
of a work, the person to whom the copy or phonorecord is transferred is
entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental, or any other means. Under this
principle, which has been established by the court decisions and section 27
of the present law, the copyright owner’s exclusive right of public distribution would have no effect upon anyone who owns “a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title” and who wishes to transfer it
to someone else or to destroy it.
Id.
227. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
228. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.6.1 (3d ed. 2020) (stating
that section 109 requires that the copy be lawfully made not that the copy be
made with the consent of the rightsholder thus permitting fair use and other
similar permissible copes to fall under the 109 transfer exceptions).
229. Id.
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While now codified, the first sale doctrine’s origin is in caselaw. BobbsMerrill v Macy & Co. involved a dispute over the subsequent sale of copyrighted work. The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court concluded that the
purchaser of a book sold with the permission of the copyright owner may
dispose of that copy but not copy it.230 The copyright holder’s copyright was
exhausted231 in reference to that specific copy. The first sale doctrine was
subsequently codified in the Copyright Act of 1909 as section 41.232
The first sale doctrine supports secondhand bookstores, transactions on
eBay, and, most notably, the core function of libraries—access to information or lending.233 The other practical effect of the first sale doctrine is a
limitation on the distribution right of the copyright owner granted under section 106(3).234 The legislative history of the adoption of section 109 is informative: “[T]he outright sale of an authorized copy of a book frees it from
copyright control over its resale price or other conditions of its future disposition. A library that has acquired ownership of a copy is entitled to lend it
under any conditions it chooses to impose . . . .”235 Still, the statute does not
sanction the creation of a copy. This begs the question of how broadly the
first sale doctrine might be read.
2.

Digital First Sale Doctrine; Does it Exist?

What of a digital first sale doctrine? Does such a creature exist? Might
one lawfully make a copy of a work, transmit the work digitally, delete the
work from the computer under the present language of section 109 and be
within the parameters of the first sale doctrine?
The first sale doctrine does not readily apply in the digital
networked environment because the owner of a particular digital
copy usually does not sell or otherwise dispose of the possession
230. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 210 U.S. 339, 350–51 (1908); see also
Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894) (noting that
one who transfers copyright restricting use cannot restrain sale of books in
violation of agreement).
231. Exhaustion is the principle that the transfer by an owner of a copy for consideration loses the right to control the downstream disposition of that copy. The
rightsholder still retains copyright in their work but has no right to the further
disposition of the alienated individual copy. See Michelle M. Wu, Revisiting
Controlled Digital Lending Post-ReDigi, FIRST MONDAY (May 2019), https://
firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/9644/7793 [https://perma.cc/
DCF9-G885].
232. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (referencing the Copyright Act of 1909).
233. See Indep. News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 517 (3d Cir. 1961) (noting
rightsholder’s control over work terminates at the time of a lawful transfer to
the first purchaser).
234. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
235. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79.
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of that copy. Rather, “disposition” of a digital copy by its owner
normally entails reproduction and transmission of that reproduction to another person. The original copy may then be retained or
destroyed.236
Is this the online or modern-day equivalent of a loan, gift, or sale of a physical book, consistent with the principles of the first sale doctrine? But the
right of reproduction is a separate and exclusive right reserved to the copyright holder under section 106 not subject to the first sale limitation.237
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, notes in her report that the transmission of a work from one to another over the Internet involves a reproduction even when the original copy of the work is deleted subsequent to
sending, and it is that act that raises the question of the first sale doctrine.238
As the right impacted is that of reproduction rather than that of distribution,
the first sale doctrine’s limitation is ineffective.239 The first sale doctrine
codified in section 109 adopted the common law restraint of alienation of
personal, tangible property.240 Transmission of a digital file is distinguishable
from that of alienation of tangible property.241 “The digital transmission of a
work does not implicate the alienability of a physical artifact. When a work
is transmitted, the sender is exercising control over the intangible work
through its reproduction rather than common law dominion over an item of
tangible personal property.”242 The report rejects the existence of a digital
first sale doctrine as existing within the language of the current version of
section 109.243

236. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105TH CONG., SECTION-BY-SECTION
ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998, *2 (Comm. Print 1998).
237. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
238. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS PURSUANT TO § 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 79 (2001).
239. Id. at 79 (noting that the product of the digital transmission is a new copy in
possession of a new person which is distinct from the application of the first
sale doctrine where the recipient receives the exact same copy with which the
transaction began).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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Controlled Digital Lending244
1.

Controlled Digital Lending – The Argument For
[Proponents of the new, and sometimes controversial, theory
called controlled digital lending (“CDL”) advance CDL as a
method that] enables a library to circulate a digitized title in place
of a physical one in a controlled manner. Under this approach, a
library may only loan simultaneously the number of copies that it
has legitimately acquired, usually through purchase or donation.
For example, if a library owns three copies of a title and digitizes
one copy, it may use CDL to circulate one digital copy and two
print, or three digital copies, or two digital copies and one print; in
all cases, it could only circulate the same number of copies that it
owned before digitization. CDL is premised on the maintenance of
an “owned to loaned” ratio. Circulation in any format is controlled
so that only one user can use any given copy at a time, for a limited time. Further, CDL systems generally employ appropriate
technical measures to prevent users from retaining a permanent
copy or distributing additional copies.245

CDL is a new theory developed by a group of librarians and others that
justifies the digitization of materials and the corresponding lending of the
same materials without first obtaining the consent of the copyright owner.246
The CDL theory is not without critics, including strong voices of opposition
from authors and publishers.247 Librarians view the theory as promoting access to materials and are more accepting of this theory than the critics.248
CDL remains untested and its ultimate fate unknown.249 In specific, its advo244. A comprehensive discussion and evaluation of controlled digital lending is
beyond the scope of this article. The discussion of controlled digital lending as
included in this paper is limited in scope to a discussion of the theory in the
provision of resources in situations of emergencies where access to the physical
collection is limited and to evaluation of application of the theory for use as a
method to provide access to information and support critical library services in
times of extremis.
245. DAVID R. HANSEN & KYLE K. COURTNEY, A WHITE PAPER ON CONTROLLED
DIGITAL LENDING OF LIBRARY BOOKS (2018), https://controlleddigitallending.org/whitepaper [https://perma.cc/GRP4-JAJE].
246. Controlled Digital Lending Is Neither Controlled nor Legal, AUTHORS GUILD
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-advocacy/controlled-digital-lending-is-neither-controlled-nor-legal [https://perma.cc/R9R3-W7QG].
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See infra Section I.D.2 (containing a more detailed discussion of the critics of
CDL).
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cates promote it as the “digital equivalent of traditional library lending.”250
The underlying theory, simple on its face, is to replicate the concept of physical lending or circulation of material albeit in a digital manner.251 The principle underlying the concept of CDL is one of equity stemming from fair use to
sanction a digital version of the traditional library act of lending permitted
under the first sale doctrine.252
CDL is premised on reading fair use and the promotion of Progress of
Science and useful Arts language in the Constitution as supporting rather
than preventing use and the first sale doctrine as extinguishing the rights of
the owner at the time of the sale of the copy.253 With fair use as the working
premise, CDL argues for the natural evolution of lending as the world moves
to a digital footprint.254 CDL also addresses the problems of and inefficiencies of in-person access to physical collections.255 Not all have the resources
or the ability to travel to distant physical locations to use physical collections,
even in the best of times.256
Essential to CDL are the concepts of control and balance.257 Proponents
of CDL suggest CDL maintains the balance between rightsholders and libraries as required by Congress.258 In addition to control of the process, there are
six specific requirements for CDL:259 (1) lawful acquisition of the original
work; (2) ownership of the work, with licensed works excluded from CDL;
(3) observance of the owned to loaned ratio; (4) single-user lending, replicating traditional physical lending; (5) limited borrowing period, replicating
traditional physical lending rules; and (6) digital rights management to prohibit “wholesale copying and redistribution.”260

250. Lila Bailey et al., Controlled Digital Lending Fact Sheet, CONTROLLED DIGIT.
LENDING BY LIBRS., https://controlleddigitallending.org/faq [https://perma.cc/
YVH4-CUVZ].
251. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 3.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 9.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 3.
256. Id.
257. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 2.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2 (“The first sale doctrine, codified in Section 109 of the Copyright Act,
provides that anyone who legally acquires a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display, or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner.”); see 17
U.S.C. § 109.
260. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 2.
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i. First Sale Doctrine and CDL
Promoters of the CDL theory suggest that CDL “mimics the economic
transaction” sanctioned by Congress with the codification of the first sale
doctrine in section 109.261 The suggestion is that first sale limits the ability of
the copyright owner to control subsequent transfer or disposition of a particular copy and “frees the courts from the administrative burden of trying to
enforce restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily movable goods.”262 CDL
advocates argue that technological evolutions invite libraries to evolve in a
manner that retains the balance as created in section 109 creating user access
in modern, digital, formats.263 The assertion is that the CDL requirements of
lawful acquisition of the original and owned to loaned ratios preserve such
balance.264
ii. Fair Use and CDL
The second prong supporting the concept of CDL is that of fair use and,
specifically, the purpose and character of the use factor.265 CDL, it is suggested, is intended to benefit the public and be a non-commercial use.266 Promotion of research and learning are identified as core purposes of CDL.267
Libraries engaging in CDL are doing so to enable broad availability of knowledge for the purpose of promoting research, scholarship and learning. These are uses specifically mentioned as
examples of fair use by Congress in the statute, and are at the core
of the constitutional purpose of the copyright system.268
Market effect is the fourth factor in a fair use analysis.269 The analysis
asks “whether the copy brings to the marketplace a competing substitute for
the original, or its derivative, so as to deprive the rights holder of significant
revenues because of the likelihood that potential purchasers may opt to acquire the copy in preference to the original.”270 As Campbell noted, also key
to the analysis of market effect is if the market is harmed or would be harmed
as a result of “unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort.”271 Courts, in
261. Id. at 6.
262. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 539 (2013).
263. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 2.
264. Id. at 1.
265. Id. at 6.
266. Id. at 9.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 5.
270. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 223 (2d Cir. 2015).
271. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
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assessing the question of harm to the market, also consider the market for
licensing so long as they are “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed.”272 In Cambridge University Press v. Patton, the court suggested that
an analysis of market effect includes consideration of the purpose of copyright with the question for analysis, posed as, does the use result in “substantial economic harm such that allowing it would frustrate the purposes of
copyright by materially impairing incentive to publish the work”?273 Advocates of CDL suggest there is no market effect as the impact on the market is
the same as is sanctioned by the first sale doctrine.274 They go even further,
stating that the first sale doctrine is itself a limit on the market that the copyright owner may control.275 “After the ‘first sale’ of the work, rightsholders
may no longer place controls on the resale, lending, or other restraints on
alienation of copies transferred.”276
2.

The Counter Argument; the Opposition

In 2020, in response to the creation of the Internet Archive’s Open Library and National Emergency Library proposals,277 the Hatchett Book
Group, HarperCollins, John Wiley & Sons and Penguin Random House filed
suit against the Internet Archive targeting the practice of CDL, promising the
first test of this theory.278 The complaint charges “willful mass copyright infringement” and “willful digital piracy on an industrial scale” that is “intentional and systematic” producing “mirror-image copies of millions of
272. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“It is indisputable that as a general matter, a copyright holder is entitled to
demand royalty for licensing others to use its copyrighted work, and that the
impact on potential licensing revenues is a proper subject for consideration in
assessing the fourth factor.”).
273. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014).
274. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 23.
275. Id. at 24.
276. Id.
277. See generally Jill Lepore, The National Emergency Library Is a Gift to Readers
Everywhere, NEW YORKER (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/
books/page-turner/the-national-emergency-library-is-a-gift-to-readers-everywhere [https://perma.cc/FL7P-LYKJ] (discussing the National Emergency Library proposed by the Internet Archive in response to the pandemic).
278. Complaint at 4, Hachette Book Grp., Inc. v. Internet Archive, No. 1:20-cv04160 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/
17211300/hachette-book-group-inc-v-internet-archive [https://perma.cc/F64694XC]; see also Eileen Bramlet, Internet Archive’s “Emergency Library”: A
Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, COPYRIGHT ALL. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://copyrightalliance.org/internet-archive-emergency-library-for-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/
V27C-LF8Z] (noting Internet Archive began CDL in 2011 digitizing out-ofprint books including works still under copyright).
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unaltered in-copyright works for which it has no rights and distributes them
in their entirety for reading purposes to the public for free, including voluminous numbers of books that are currently commercially available.”279 Critics
argue of significance is the failure of the Internet Archive to honor the owned
to loaned ratio as is specified by the requirements of CDL.280 The publishers
argue that no reading of fair use supports “the systematic mass copying or
distribution of entire books for the purpose of mass reading.”281 Critics also
address the concept of transformative use, noting that nothing new is added
and there is no transformative use.282 Similarly, the question of the first sale
doctrine as supporting CDL is challenged, suggesting that the making and
distribution of a copy of a lawfully acquired work is outside the scope of the
first sale doctrine, which merely permits the owner to dispose of that particular print copy.283
The ongoing litigation between Hatchett Brook Group et al. and Internet Archive is the most overt manifestation of opposition to CDL but is
merely the most recent. Authors and publishers, including the American Association of Publishers, The Authors’ Guild, and National Writers Union,
long have voiced opposition to the theory.284 The authors and publisher arguments focus on the market effect factor of fair use, ignoring the distinction
between a copy and a work and the inapplicability of the first sale doctrine.285
As one commentator highlighting the fragility of the CDL argument
observed:
In the same discussion thread [on the Library Licensing discussion
list in May and June 2020], David Hansen . . . [responded,] “to be
very clear to all, we don’t have a fair use case squarely on point
that addresses controlled library lending of digitized books, so for
now we are making analogies to other fair use cases and the principles they articulate. Fair use is a fact intensive inquiry and so
even then, how a court would treat IA’s [Internet Archive’s] implementation of CDL under fair use as compared to other imple279. Complaint, supra note 278, at 2.
280. Id. at 4 (noting that the Internet Archive initially observed the owned to loaned
ratio requirement of CDL but in light of the pandemic “announced with great
fanfare that it would remove these already deficient limitations that were purportedly in place.”).
281. Id. at 6.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Appeal From the Victims of Controlled Digital Lending (CDL), NAT’L
WRITERS UNION (Feb. 2019), https://nwu.org/book-division/cdl/appeal [https://
perma.cc/CAU7-3RD2] (noting that multiple author and publisher groups
jointly opposing controlled digital lending).
285. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 10.
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mentations (e.g., how HathiTrust is providing access right now
under ETAS) may differ.286
The flaws in CDL relate to the as yet not recognized concept of a digital
first sale doctrine, the creation of an entire copy of a work that is questionably transformative, and the potential for market effect or harm for widespread copying.287 Explored first in 2001 by the U.S. Copyright Office and
again in 2016 by the Department of Commerce, the concept of a digital first
sale doctrine was rejected as exiting in a state of suspended animation due to
technology and uncertainty as to how to enforce owned to loaned ratios.288
Amount and substantiality, or the third fair use factor, is arguably problematic to the CDL premise. In fair use analysis, a rule of thumb is that the
greater the amount of original content used in relation to the whole, the less
likely the use is fair.289 The amount used is not viewed in a vacuum but rather
in light of the purpose and character of the use.290 CDL critics note that the
use of CDL is not limited to the uses specified in the preamble to § 107, even
though such uses are merely illustrative.291 Courts have sanctioned instances
where the entirety of the original is permissibly copied.292 There is no hiding
286. Marydee Ojala, Controlled Digital Lending: Legal Lending or Piracy?, 45 ONLINE SEARCHER (Jan./Feb. 2021), at 25, 27.
287. See discussion of fair use first factor and concept of transformative use supra
Section I.A.3.
288. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 9–10.
289. See Goldstein, supra note 15, at § 12.2.2.3.
290. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 604 (1985);
see also Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In
weighing this factor we assess the quality and value of the material used and
whether the amount copied is reasonable in relation to the purported justification under the first factor.”).
291. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 9.
292. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 460, 449 (1984)
(“[T]he fact that the entire work is reproduced . . . does not have its ordinary
effect of militating against a finding of fair use.”); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens LP,
737 F.3d 932, 943 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Jan. 14, 2014) (noting use of
entire work allowable to achieve permissible purpose); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye
v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 642 (4th Cir. 2009); Chicago Bd. of Educ.
v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting “there is no per se
rule against copying in the name of fair use an entire copyrighted work if necessary”); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 206 (4th Cir. 1998)
(noting amount and substantiality factor weighed in favor when copy provided
to researcher was complete copy because for her scholarly work she “needed
access to either the original or an “entire copy”); Bill Graham Archives v.
Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the
third factor favored the use when displaying “reduced versions of the original
images and intermingled these visuals with text and original graphic art . . . .
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of CDL’s purpose to provide readers a digital, full-text copy of a book accessible online.293 CDL advocates counter the entirety issue with a two-prong
attack suggesting that the third factor of the fair use analysis, amount and
substantiality, is either neutral or weighs in favor of fair use.294 Specifically,
they argue that: (1) there is not a per se rule prohibiting a fair use creation of
an entire copy;295 and (2) the requirement of CDL includes both technological and temporal limits on use intended to mirror the activity of physical
lending.296
The Association of American Publishers registered their disagreement
with CDL and the arguments underpinning the theory as espoused in the
White Paper supporting CDL,297 suggesting that the theory:
blurs the line between works and copies in its analysis, ignoring
well-established legal distinctions between these terms in the Copyright Act as well as the reality that Congress imposed statutory
limitations on library lending. This is a fundamental weakness of
the [CDL theory’s] first sale argument as well as its market-harm
argument under fair use and of . . . the [theory’s] general assertion
that the law should view CDL as functionally equivalent to hard
copy lending. To the contrary AAP finds it highly unlikely under
current law that CDL-sanctioned practices would be shielded by
either the first sale doctrine . . . or the fair use doctrine. . . because
such practices involve making and transmitting new digital copies
of print books.298
The Association of American Publishers also assert that factor four of
the fair use analysis, market effect, undercuts the fair use portion of the CDL
theory. The suggestion is that CDL results in cognizable harm to both actual
and potential markets of publishers.299
[C]ourts have concluded that [copying an entire work] does not necessarily
weigh against fair use because copy the entirety of a work is sometime necessary to make a fair use of the image. [(citation omitted)]. Adopting this reasoning, we conclude that the third-factor inquiry must consider that the ‘extent of
permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use.’”).
293. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 22.
294. Id. at 3, 22.
295. See id. at 22; Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 629 (“[T]here is no per se rule
against copying in the name of fair use an entire copyrighted work if
necessary.”).
296. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 3, 22.
297. Id.
298. Press Release, Association of American Publishers, Statement on Flawed Theory of “Controlled Digital Lending” (Feb. 4, 2019) (available through State
News Service).
299. Id.
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Because publishers generally make e-book lending licenses available to libraries for both frontlist and backlist works, and CDL is
expressly designed to allow libraries to create their own substitute
e-book editions for such works, it is clear that CDL copying
would create direct market substitutes for publishers’ extensive licensed offerings, not only for digital copies but also for hard copies. The substitutes are not at all transformative of either the
copied work or the use of the copied work. Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that an actual, present market for a
particular derivative use need not exist in order for market harm to
be cognizable under the fourth fair use factor, provided that the
use is one that ‘creators of original works would in general develop or authorize others to develop.’300
Publishers take issue with the assumption that the markets for print and
e-books are the same and that format is fungible. They argue that the assumption is:
demonstrably not true, as the publishing industry and libraries
have over many years created and participated in entirely separate
markets for the sale of physical books and the licensing of e-books
at different prices and on different terms and conditions . . . CDL
is designed to compete with copyright owners’ digital market, not
some hypothetical physical market, making the “owned to loaned”
concept in CDL irrelevant to the application of §109(a) and
§107.301
Authors and publishers also point to the Second Circuit’s 2018 decision
in Capital Records v. ReDigi, reading the holding as a rejection of the interpretation of section 109 as a statement of broad principles asserted by
CDL.302 The Author’s Guild argues that:
CDL relies on an incorrect interpretation of copyright’s “fair use”
doctrine to give legal cover to Open Library and potentially other
CDL users’ outright piracy—scanning books without permission
and lending those copies via the internet. By restricting access to
one user at a time for each copy that the library owns, the proponents analogize scanning and creating digital copies to physically
lending a legally purchased book. Although it sounds like an appealing argument, the CDL concept is based on a faulty legal argument that has already been rejected by the U.S. courts. In
Capitol Records v. ReDigi, the Second Circuit held that reselling a
digital file without the copyright holder’s permission is not fair

300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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use because the resales competed with the legitimate copyright
holder’s sales. It found that market harm was likely because the
lower-priced resales were sold to the same customers who would
have otherwise purchased new licenses. In this regard, the court
emphasized a crucial distinction between resales of physical media and resales of digital content, noting that unlike physical copies, digital content does not deteriorate from use and thus directly
substitutes new licensed digital copies. The same rationale applies
to the unauthorized resale or lending of eBooks. Allowing libraries to digitize and circulate copies made from physical books in
their collection without authorization, when the same books are
available or potentially available on the market directly competes
with the market for legitimate eBook licenses, ultimately usurping
a valuable piece of the market from authors and copyright
holders.303
The Internet Archive’s National Emergency Library initiative ceased to
operate on June 16, 2020, two weeks in advance of the stated June 30, 2020
date originally given.304 Internet Archive founder Kahle announced the early
closing due in direct response to the Hachett Group’s lawsuit.305 While the
Internet Archive still relies on CDL and the lawsuit continues, it is clear that
CDL is as of yet unproven.306 Opponents of the theory might suggest the
early closing reflects the weakness in the CDL theory.
II. USING STATUTORY DEVICES, THEORIES AND A
DECISION MATRIX TO ADDRESS AN EMERGENCY:
WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOES NOT?
As suggested in the introduction to this paper, emergency circumstances
arise from many and varied circumstances. Hurricanes and tornados are destructive, resulting in property damage from wind and water. Disruption from
fires involves smoke, water, and chemical damage in addition to destruction
of property. By contrast, a pandemic is both the same and different. A pandemic may lack the destructive element of fire, hurricane, or tornado, but all
have the characteristic of creating barriers to institutions and thus print collections. The hypothetical constructed for evaluation of our devices and the303. Controlled Digital Lending Is Neither Controlled nor Legal, AUTHORS GUILD
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-advocacy/controlled-digital-lending-is-neither-controlled-nor-legal [https://perma.cc/DGP4-DHE4].
Contra Wu, supra note 231.
304. Andrew Albanese, Internet Archive to End ‘National Emergency Library’ Initiative, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (June 12, 2020), https://www.publishersweekly.com/
pw/by-topic/digital/copyright/article/83584-internet-archive-to-end-nationalemergency-library-initiative.html [https://perma.cc/G66U-KER8].
305. Id.
306. Id.
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ory, is that of a pandemic and focuses on providing the information and
resources to support students in the pursuit of their courses and faculty in
teaching and scholarship.
A.

The Hypothetical Exemplar an Emergency, a Pandemic and
University Course Reserves
Consider the following hypothetical for the purposes of this section:
A new, highly contagious variant of scarlet fever with a significant
instance of hospitalization resulted in the issuance of quarantine
mandates and a statewide stay-at home-order. State University
transitioned to remote learning. Only those deemed essential personnel are permitted on campus. The president of State University
determined classes will move to remote (virtual) learning platforms for the remainder of the semester. The libraries are closed
to all but a minimal staff. Students and faculty require access to
information in the library collections and course reserves, some of
which is only currently available in print. Requests for digital access to study aids, textbooks, and required readings currently on
course reserve inundate the library. Members of the faculty are
also requesting materials in support of existing research and
scholarship from members. Members of the library’s public services team were instructed to fill those requests with either materials from existing digital collections, subject to the terms of the
license agreement, or arrange for contactless delivery of print
materials. This method fills a significant number of requests; however, a small number of requested items are only available in print
format in the library’s current collection and contactless delivery
of the print is insufficient to fill the need. The remaining question
is, might the library digitize, on a case-by-case instance, and
make available through authenticated access portals selected
print materials for use by faculty and students for the specific purposes of research, teaching, and education during the term of the
stay at home order for temporary use without the permission of
the owner of copyright?

This discussion identifies the theory of CDL and the existing statutory devices of fair use, the library exception, and the first sale doctrine existing in
the current Copyright Act as means to share materials presently falling into
copyright without the consent of the rightsholder. Analysis of the statutory
devices and the theory of CDL follow.
B.

Fair Use; Section 107

Analysis of applicability of fair use begins in equity. Fair use is an affirmative or equitable defense asking the court to excuse the infringing act
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due to an inequity.307 In copyright, equity asks if the copyright bargain is
unfair in the specific instance, cubing the creativity and innovation desired
and opting for the legitimacy of the infringing copy due to the circumstances.
The over-arching question of equity is, does the monopoly granted to the
rights holder harm the public interest?308 Put another way, fair use is a context model requiring a court to embrace flexible application to retain the equitable bargain and maintain the desired balance of monopoly to public
benefit.309 Analysis of the equitable bargain begins with examination of the
non-exclusive uses suggested by the preamble to section 107 and then moves
to the articulated four factors that shall be considered in a determination of
fair use.310 Each of the four factors is to be considered and balanced in light
of the relevant circumstances,311 although some of the factors may be more
important than others in a given analysis due to the context of the use.312 In
the hypothetical emergency circumstance, a fair use analysis requires evaluation of each factor in the context of the nature of the emergency circumstance. Here the analysis considers if a digital reproduction created by
scanning an entire work presently under copyright for use in an educational
circumstance of a course reserve reading, other teaching use, furtherance of
research or scholarship distributed using a password protected and authenticated portal in the context of an existing emergency where access is problematic qualifies as a fair use.
1.

Section 107 - The Preamble

The preamble to section 107 sets out an illustrative list of uses that constitute permissible fair use of copyrighted material.313 Included in that list are
307. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d. Cir. 2014) states:
At the same time, there are important limits to an author’s rights to control
original and derivative works. One such limit is the doctrine of “fair use”
which allows the public to draw upon copyrighted materials without the
permission of the copyright holder in circumstances (citation omitted)
“From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use
of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s
very purpose ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’” . . .
(quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574).
Id.
308. See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2021).
309. Id.
310. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
311. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1197.
312. Id.
313. The preamble states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or pho-
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the uses of teaching, scholarship, and research.314 The failure to fall into one
of the named uses is not fatal, but a use reflecting one of the enumerated
categories provides support in favor of a conclusion of fair use.315 Use for the
purpose of teaching, research, or scholarship also factors into the overall equitable equation when balancing the public benefit to that of monopoly,
favoring the creator. Sacrifice is an anticipated element of an emergency.
Asking those who benefit from a limited monopoly to concede a bit in a time
of extremis in a manner that provides significant benefit to the public lies at
the very heart of equity.
2.

Factor One – Purpose and Character of the Use

The first statutory factor focuses on how the copyrighted material is
used.316 Explicit in the how is an examination of whether the use is commercial versus educational or non-profit.317 While commercial uses are not de
facto prohibited, copying of works to be used in the furtherance of teaching,
scholarship, and/or research incline towards a finding of fair use.318 The inclusion of the reading, pre-emergency, in a course reserve for use in a course
sanctioned by an educational institution establishes a pre-existing intent that
the material is to be used in furtherance of an educational purpose and is
valued for such teaching or research purpose. Similar evidence of pre-existing uses for teaching, research, and scholarship also documents the value
of the material to such endeavor and the continuing need for the material.
Use in the educational environment also favors fair use. If the copyright bargain is represented as a scale, use for education or research and the context of
the emergency are weights that incline toward the benefit of the public. The
how in the hypothetical emergency indicates a non-commercial, teaching, research, or scholarship use which suggests a benefit to the public. A facts and
circumstances argument in equity could suggest factor one favors fair use.
The other significant consideration in evaluating factor one is whether
or not the new use is transformative.319 The query’s focus is whether or not
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . .
17 U.S.C. § 107.
314. Id.
315. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 26 (2019).
316. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
317. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
318. Goldstein, supra note 15, at § 12.2.2.1.
319. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014) (“An important focus of the first factor is whether the use is transformative. A use is trans-
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the work “adds something new with a further purpose or different character
altering the first with new expression, meaning or message.”320 Mere addition
of value is not the focus but, rather, is the new work “one that serves a new
and different function from the original work and is not a substitute for [the
original?]”321 The failure to be transformative does not defeat an ultimate
finding of fair use, although factor one may weigh against fair use for lack of
transformation.322 The Supreme Court has held that ordinary copies could
constitute a fair use in the case of time shifting.323
In the emergency hypothetical, the copy is a one-to-one translation. Arguably nothing new is added, suggesting an absence of transformative use. A
scanned reproduction of an entire work distributed digitally, even in a limited
scope, alone is not transformative. However, when relevant circumstances
are added to the evaluation of the factor of transformative use in an equitable
balancing, might the factor incline towards fair use? If one considers a scale,
the emergency circumstance might act as the additional weight to tip the
scale in favor of a transformative use. Even when the frame is posed as a
work that serves a new and different function and not a substitute for the
original, it is hard to argue that an emergency copy is transformative. In point
of fact it is a substitute for the original. But is the correct frame one that
recognizes the new as a substitute for an original not otherwise available for
a period of time due to the underlying circumstances of the emergency? Does
the transformation exist in providing access for teaching, research, or scholarship to that specifically not available due to the emergency? Some believe
that the transformative use may be found in the “advancement of
knowledge.”324
3.

Factor Two – Nature of the Copyrighted Work

Factor two considers the nature of the use of the copyrighted work.325
This factor explores if the new work is “of the creative or instructive type
that the copyright laws value and seek to foster.”326 Highly expressive works
are more likely to indicate a non-fair use determination than a transformative
use of highly factual works. In Google, the Court suggested that a determination that a use is transformative must consider the purpose and character of
formative if it does something more than repackage or republish the original
copyrighted work.”).
320. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
321. Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 96.
322. Id.
323. See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
324. Goldstein, supra note 15, at § 12.2.2.
325. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
326. Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 95.
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the use and the relevant circumstances.327 Also of consideration is whether or
not the original work is published or unpublished.328 A case-by-case evaluation of each work is needed to consider the published or unpublished status
of the underlying work. Materials placed on course reserve and used for
teaching are likely published and evidence significant expressive content,
placing them closer to the core of copyright. But the Court in Google urged a
deeper analysis of this factor, suggesting that the nature be considered in
context of the purpose and character.329 In emergency circumstances, copying
for the explicit purposes of teaching, research, and scholarship to meet the
information needs of the circumstances would seem to advance the creativity
urged by the Constitution and, perhaps, in consideration of all facts, suggest a
fair use.
4.

Factor Three – Amount and Substantiality

The third factor considers the quantity and the importance of taken information.330 As Harper & Row and Campbell discussed, there is a continuum as to the amount used in a new work.331 The amount taken can be
minimal and deny a fair use claim where the meat or heart of a work is taken
or all, or substantially all, of a work may be used and support a claim of fair
use when central to a valid purpose.332 Google suggests the scale tips to fair
use when the amount reproduced is used for a valid and transformational
purpose.333 No absolute rule exists regarding how much of a work may be
reproduced and still qualify as a fair use.334 Specific mathematical guidelines
suggested by the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works were rejected, leaving as a rule of thumb to take the smallest
amount needed to effectuate the purpose.335 The amount taken is dependent
upon the purpose and character of the use.336 This factor depends in part on
what the “whole” is for the hypothetical course reserve or other teaching,
327. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1203 (2021).
328. Goldstein, supra note 15, at § 12.2.2.2.
329. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1203.
330. Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 95 (“The third factor asks whether the secondary
use employs more of the copyrighted work than is necessary and whether the
copying was excessive in relation to any valid purposes asserted under the first
factor.”).
331. See discussion supra Section I.A.4.
332. See Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 98.
333. Google, 141 S. Ct at 1205.
334. Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 98.
335. See generally National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), Final Report on the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, 3 COMPUT. L.J. 53 (1981).
336. Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 98.
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research, or scholarship purpose. A portion of a larger work, such as a chapter or article, is an easier call than the entirety of a work weighting in favor of
fair use. But what of an entire pamphlet or short work or a text? Is the entirety used for a valid and transformational purpose?337 Following Google, if
the amount is used for teaching, scholarship, or research in an emergency
circumstance, and the minimal amount needed to satisfy the purpose is the
entirety but the benefit to the public great, equity may tip the scale in favor of
fair use.338
5.

Factor Four – Market Effect

Market effect is an analysis of the impact of the new work on the market
value for the original work:339 “[a] fair use must not excessively damage the
market for the original by providing the public with a substitute for that
work.”340 In simpler terms, the copy may not act as a substitute for the original, thus diminishing the market for the original. In our instance, the market
effect is likely to be negligible. The intended audience is limited to that of
students, faculty, and researchers of a specific institution. Access to the digital copy is proscribed through the use of an authenticated portal where the
user must verify their credentials associating themselves with the institution.
The benefit to the public or patron here is significant. Professors assign readings in support of identified learning objectives. The assignment or need for
the constituent material was identified prior to the advent of the emergency.
Providing access to those, often supplemental, materials furthers the education of students enrolled in the class, on-going research, or scholarship. Specifically, when reviewing course reserve numbers, the expectation is that
students would opt to forgo such readings rather than spend additional money
to purchase such materials from Amazon or otherwise pay for supplemental
materials, thus diminishing their educational experience.341 In such limited
and proscribed instances, it is unlikely that the existence of a new copy, provided in limited and protected circumstances, will act as a substitute for the
original in a manner to significantly diminish or obstruct market. In such
limited circumstances, it is likely that the market effect factor will point to a
fair use.
337. Id. at 95 (“In weighing this factor, we assess the quantity and value of the
materials used and whether the amount copied is reasonable in relation to the
purported justifications for the use under the first factor.”).
338. Id. at 98 (“For some purposes, it may be necessary to copy the entire copyrighted work, in which case Factor Three does not weigh against a finding of
fair use.”).
339. Id. at 99.
340. Id. at 95.
341. See generally Caleb Nichols, In Defense of Course Reserves: A review of California Programs, 80 COLL. & RSCH. LIBRS. (2019), https://crln.acrl.org/index.php/crlnews/article/view/23583/30895 [https://perma.cc/A47E-ALYH].
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Considering the role of equity and the statutory factors, the conclusion
for our hypothetical emergency suggests that fair use is a viable device to
create digital copies of materials for use in an emergency. A case-by-case
analysis of the four factors for each work to be copied is required.
C.

Library Exception Section 108

The library and archive exception codified in section 108 of the Copyright Act is narrow and specific.342 While not written to specifically address
an emergency situation, it remains a viable device to support the critical library service of delivery of information in emergencies. Subsections (c) – (e)
of section 108 are of particular interest for application in emergencies. Permitting the creation of replacement copies and reproductions specifically for
research and scholarship, section 108 is a statutory provision a librarian
might use in narrowly circumscribed circumstances that includes a time of
extremis.343 As discussed previously, four general requirements must be met
to take advantage of section 108: (1) the institution is a permissible institution, a library or archive; (2) distribution of the created copy does not serve
either a direct or indirect purpose of a commercial advantage; (3) the library
or archive is open to the public or researchers in specialized fields; and (4)
any copy created includes a notice of copyright.344
The general requirements are easily enough met by the hypothetical library. The institution is clearly defined as a library. As a library attached to a
longstanding educational institution, it is unlikely to beg discussion of the
first requirement. The second requirement, absence of a direct or indirect
commercial advantage, is similarly unlikely to present an issue in an emergency circumstance. The information or work in question that presently exists in the library collection is available to a patron. The barrier is in the
ability of the patron to access and use the information. Providing a digital
copy through existing authenticated portals for use in support of present research, teaching, or scholarship by an existing faculty member is unlikely to
supplant a market for the underlying work but, rather, serves to permit existing, in-progress work to continue unimpeded. Building on the analysis
above in the fair use market effect factor analysis, libraries at educational
institutions making copies in support of specific, existing research, teaching,
and scholarship needs when the dictates of the emergency otherwise create
significant and perhaps absolute barriers of access to the print version of the
work are unlikely to create any commercial advantage when a digital copy is
created to address the specific and temporary need. Inclusion of a notice of
copyright should be part of exiting library workflows and satisfy the fourth
requirement.

342. See 17 U.S.C. § 108.
343. § 108(e).
344. § 108(a)(1)–(3).
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More vexing is the third requirement requiring the library to be open to
the public or researchers in specific fields. What is open in an instance when
the physical manifestation of the library is restricted to all but essential personnel providing the routine library services and functions to their patrons?
During the 2020 pandemic the physical spaces of libraries were not accessible by the public, but libraries remained open using technology to meet the
information needs of their users. In such situations, there is a strong argument that the library remains open.345 If the library continues to serve the
same group of patrons it served prior to implementing restrictions to its physical space, the suggestion is that the library be viewed as open in the context
of this requirement.
Other requirements of section 108 are more problematic. Such requirements should be evaluated in the context of a defined and existing emergency. They include:
1. use of the reproduction on the library premises;
2. display of a notice of copyright where orders are made;
3. original work is damaged, deteriorating, lost, stolen, or exists in an
obsolete format; and
4. reasonable investigation and determination that a replacement copy
may be obtained at a reasonable price.346
Is a library’s existence defined by brick and mortar? Even in times of
regular operations (non-emergency situations), libraries are no longer defined
by brick and mortar. E-book collections and large subscription (digital)
database collections made available for off-campus access through authenticated portals and features such as chat and Zoom now extend the library’s
reach and existence far beyond that of the brick and mortar. One might argue
that providing a copy on similar terms as a library customarily provides for
use in the same or similar manner is consistent with using the copy within the
library premises. Use of a proxy server or similar authentication process to
restrict access helps to define the borders of the library’s existence.
How does a library seeking the protection of section 108 address the
need to display notice of copyright where orders are made? Physical display
at a point of service in a building is simple and reflects the traditional expectation at an earlier point in time. Are there other options? Inclusion of the
language on a webpage is arguably a suitable alternative. The reality of today’s library is that requests for materials are more likely to be made via an
online request system using the library’s web presence as tied into a library
system than in person at a window or desk. Given this reality, the notice of
copyright should appear at the online point of request regardless of the presence of an emergency or normal operating procedure.

345. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994)
(construing “open” in the context of for-profit corporate libraries closed to
rivals).
346. 17 U.S.C. § 108(e).
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Might the term “obsolete format” include print in certain circumstances?
Print is arguably the most stable format, which argues against a conclusion of
obsolesce.347 Section 108 defines “obsolete” in the terms of technology and a
work no longer available or capable of perception or no longer commercially
available.348 Does the emergency context argue for a broader reading of the
language “not commercially available” where issues such as contamination
of print or prohibition of a customary library service such as course reserve
support the conclusion that for a temporary time the print format is obsolete?
In our hypothetical instance, print fails to provide a suitable response to the
specific circumstances. It is the emergency that creates the barrier to the existing print. Replacing print with print leaves the library and the borrower in
the exact same place. Contactless delivery might obviate the issue in limited
instances but what of the library service of a course reserve reading? Course
reserve services are intended to permit multiple patrons to access the material
for brief periods of time. Contactless delivery runs counter to the use of multiple patrons for short periods. In such circumstances, print as a format fails
to serve its intended purpose and is arguably obsolete for the period of the
emergency.
Reasonable investigation for a replacement copy is the final requirement
to invoke section 108.349 The investigation and price of the replacement must
both be reasonable.350 Of note is that the creation of the reproduction cannot
replace the ultimate need to purchase.351 In an emergency circumstance, the
need is temporary and the purchase already exists. If the language is read as
requiring an additional purchase, then it is a duplication expanding the market rather than retaining the original market. Borrowing from the CDL theory
requiring a one-to-one translation would seem to bolster the argument that
creation of a digital copy of a published resource presently existing in a library’s print collection would be consistent with the requirements of section
108. Is the requirement to investigate and replace an obsolete format with a
duplicate copy in the same obsolete format? Such interpretation seems contrary to the intent of the statute and the inherent copyright bargain. The benefit to the public here is significant given the support of education, research,
and scholarship.

347. See Gasaway, supra note 201, at 647 (discussing preservation and stability of
print as a format). “Library preservation took on a different complexion. The
concern was not that the book would be removed from the collection, but
rather, that the physical condition of the work would remain sufficiently stable
so that readers could enjoy the work without undue deterioration of that particular copy.” Id.
348. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c).
349. § 108(c)(1).
350. Id.
351. See Gasaway, supra note 201, at 656.
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Digitizing print materials for use within the existing footprint of the
library, including its digital reach in a time of emergency to meet the customary and intended services of a library, suggests a viable solution. In the hypothetical situation, there is a traditional library with a brick-and-mortar
existence extended by digital services provided through authenticated portals.
Notice of copyright is prominently displayed in physical and online systems.
The library’s physical presence is closed to all but essential members of the
library staff, but the library remains open to all users using technology. Digitized reproduction is clearly delineated for temporary use during the time of
the emergency and of materials currently owned by the library. The temporary digital copy might even bear a notice to such effect. Reproductions are
limited to (1) those needed for teaching, research, and scholarship of patrons
and not as a substitute for acquisition of materials generally expected to be
purchased and (2) as is necessary to provide traditional library services during the time of and as limited by the circumstances of the emergency. While
section 108 is narrowly tailored, using section 108 in narrow instances created by dictates of the emergency to deliver traditional library services is a
consistent reading of the statue.
D.

The First Sale Doctrine; Section 109

The first sale doctrine addresses the exclusive rights conferred to the
copyright owner under section 106.352 The distribution right is specifically
limited by application of the first sale doctrine, but the reproduction right
conferred under section 106 remains unaffected.353 This proves to be problematic for application of the first sale doctrine as a statutory device for use
in our emergency circumstance absent another statutory provision such as
fair use or the library exception. Standing alone, the first sale doctrine permits the owner of a copy to further alienate that copy subject to the concept
of exhaustion.354 Alienation is traditionally construed to mean a sale, loan,
gift, or other transfer of the physical object.355 The theory of exhaustion is
what permits libraries to provide critical services such as the loan of a book.
But might a library create a new copy of a work they own using the concept
of exhaustion? To date the concept of a digital first sale doctrine has been
rejected.356 The insurmountable problem is the reproduction right conveyed
to the copyright owner under section 106. Creation of a digital copy of an
existing work by definition involves a reproduction. Exhaustion provides an
exception to the distribution right but fails to offer an exception to the reproduction right. Absent such an exception to address the reproduction, the first
352. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 7.
353. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
354. Exhaustion-of-Rights Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
355. Alienate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
356. See Capitol Recs., LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 664 (2d Cir. 2018); see
also Wu, supra note 231.
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sale doctrine seems to be an imperfect statutory device to address emergency
needs.
E.

Controlled Digital Lending and Emergencies

Controlled Digital Lending, in theory, presents as an optimal means to
address emergencies. CDL suggests six threshold requirements that are easily
met by libraries such as the one described in the hypothetical.357 Lawful acquisition of the original work is met as the library already owns a print copy
of the work. Licensed works are not at issue as the library’s actions are prescribed by the terms of the license agreement. Librarians are experts at lending materials, thus establishing borrowing periods and limiting access to
observe owned to loaned ratios is in trusted and expert hands. The question
of systematic digitization is real but not relevant when the digitization is on a
case-by-case basis to address individual and specific requests in furtherance
of teaching scholarship, and research. In the sole matter that has to date challenged the concept of CDL, the language of the plaintiff is illustrative, “[f]or
the avoidance of doubt, this lawsuit is not about the occasional transmission
of a title under appropriately limited circumstances, nor about anything
permissioned or in the public domain.”358 Such language suggests an occasional copy may be acceptable in circumstances such as the hypothetical
emergency. Where the reproduction finds permissibility under a theory of
fair use or the library exception, CDL appears to create a viable option for
the librarian. Where fair use and/or the library exception is not available to
sanction the reproduction, reliance on exhaustion and first sale is likely
misplaced.
CDL is illuminating in regard to how a library might establish a distribution process that recognizes the copyright bargain. CDL is a system of
distribution for digitized copies that recognizes the requirements that the library must, first, lawfully acquire the work and replicate digitally the physical lending service in a system with attributes that acknowledge the rights
and labor of the author while balancing the unique circumstances of the situation and the desire to incentivize creativity and innovation, hallmarks of the
copyright bargain.359

357. Hansen & Courtney, supra note 245, at 3.
358. Complaint, supra note 278, at 3.
359. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2014) ( “In
short our law recognizes that copyright is ‘not an inevitable, divine, or natural
right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their creations. It is
designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual
enrichment of the public.’”) (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990)).
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A Decision Matrix

Establishing and documenting the emergency, its exact nature, and extent of the impact on the library’s ability to perform usual and customary
library functions is the threshold question to be evaluated prior to any plan of
temporary digitization of resources. Examining this threshold question is an
essential step given the fact-based nature and analysis underlying the statutory devices. As suggested in the conversation regarding the benefit of section 108, the ability to make decisions without fear of litigation is valuable. A
decision matrix promotes the same goal, that of providing a tool to make
decisions in situations that are fact-driven. Creation and use of a decision
matrix promote consistent and systematic analysis, resulting in decisions
made on specific, consistent, and relevant criteria. A decision matrix for
making digital copies in the hypothetical emergency might look like the one
below.
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ADecisionMatrix
1.

2.

Causation/Identification of emergency. Can the
library document the presence of an emergency?
o
Fire
o
Weather
Yes
o
PublicHealth
o
Other:___________

No

Stop, you have failed to answer
the threshold question of a
sufficient emergency situation.

Extent of Impact (Proximity) – Is information readily
available at another library in close proximity?

Consider:
o Local impact Ͳ only my library is impacted, and others
nearby have the same resource(s) available for use.
o Local impact – only my library is impacted but it is the
only one nearby with the needed resources.
o All libraries impacted campus/region/state/nation/world
such that the resource is highly difficult to obtain.

No

Temporal Impact (duration) – Do authorities predict
the emergency situation to be an extensive duration
or of unknown duration?

Impact is minimal and/or
information is readily available in
the community with minimal or
no barriers.
Stop, you have failed to answer
the threshold question of a
sufficient emergency situation.

Yes

3.

Library cannot document the
presence of an emergency.

No

Yes

Impact of the emergency is of a
short duration and access to the
information in the normal course
of the library operation will be
restored in an expedient manner.
Stop you have failed to answer
the threshold question of a
sufficient emergency situation.

4.

Purpose and character of the request – Is the library
resource requested to support teaching or
scholarship?

No
Use is outside the scope of the
fair use analysis. Stop.

Yes

5.

Is the request is made by a faculty member, staff
member of student

No
Stop.

Yes
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Does the library own the resource requested?
Yes
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Library licenses the content (see
license
agreement
for
determination) or does not own
the content.
Stop.

No
7.

Further review under § 108 is
required.

Is the item published?
Yes

Stop.

8.

Are alternatives means to access substantial or costly?

No
Yes

Alternatives are substantial or
costly.

Low cost or minimal barriers, such
as
interlibrary
loan,
direct
purchase or other alternatives, to
acquiring the information are
available.
Recommendation is to consider
such alternatives.

Library may make digital copy.

In the hypothetical emergency outlined above a completed decision matrix might look like the analysis below.
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ACompletedDecisionMatrix
1.

2.

Causation/Identification of emergency. Can the
library document the presence of an emergency?
o
Fire
o
Weather
Yes
o
PublicHealth
o
Other:___________

No

Stop, you have failed to answer
the threshold question of a
sufficient emergency situation.

Extent of Impact (Proximity) – Is information readily
available at another library in close proximity?

Consider:
o Local impact Ͳ only my library is impacted, and others
nearby have the same resource(s) available for use.
o Local impact – only my library is impacted but it is the
only one nearby with the needed resources.
o All libraries impacted campus/region/state/nation/world
such that the resource is highly difficult to obtain.

No

Temporal Impact (duration) – Do authorities predict
the emergency situation to be an extensive duration
or of unknown duration?

Impact is minimal and/or
information is readily available in
the community with minimal or
no barriers.
Stop, you have failed to answer
the threshold question of a
sufficient emergency situation.

Yes

3.

Library cannot document the
presence of an emergency.

No

Yes

Impact of the emergency is of a
short duration and access to the
information in the normal course
of the library operation will be
restored in an expedient manner.
Stop you have failed to answer
the threshold question of a
sufficient emergency situation.

4.

Purpose and character of the request – Is the library
resource requested to support teaching or
scholarship?

No
Use is outside the scope of the
fair use analysis. Stop.

Yes

5.

Is the request is made by a faculty member, staff
member of student

No
Stop.

Yes
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Library licenses the content (see
license
agreement
for
determination) or does not own
the content.
Stop.

No
7.

Further review under § 108 is
required.

Is the item published?
Yes

Stop.

8.

Are alternatives means to access substantial or costly?

No
Yes

Low cost or minimal barriers, such
as
interlibrary
loan,
direct
purchase or other alternatives, to
acquiring the information are
available.
Recommendation is to consider
such alternatives.

Alternatives are substantial or
costly.
Library may make digital copy.

III.

CONCLUSION

Destructive events such as hurricanes and tornados, incidents of wildfires, and now pandemics are, unfortunately, all too common occurrences in
our lives. The impact of such events is immediate and consequential. Temporary interruption of life and common services is the expected consequence of
such emergencies. Still, life goes on and those who provide services are expected to adapt. Consider how higher education managed to move the entire
system from a physical point of delivery to an online point of delivery using
technology in a matter of a few weeks. This is the expected response. This is
the new normal.
Libraries are vital to the information ecosystem. Academic libraries support the educational and research missions of our world and provide the vital
service of supplying both information and access to information that underpins the educational experience in addition to research that supports innovation and the entrepreneurial spirit. Natural disasters that create emergency
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situations and disruptions to customary library services present situations that
require out-of-the-box solutions and creativity. Innovative solutions to eliminate barriers to information are required.
Copyright is often an impediment to meeting the information needs in
emergencies. Innovative solutions require librarians to address questions of
copyright in the context of the copyright bargain and in light of the circumstance of the emergency. Innovation is consistent with principles of equity
and the grand copyright bargain with, as Google suggests, being mindful of
the benefit to the public and the need to stimulate creativity and innovation
while respecting the need to reward the creator for their labor.
Librarians possess limited means to address even the temporary disruption of services, but such disruptions invoke significant consequences, including potential harm to the public. Librarians must address copyright with
an eye to finding solutions to the impediments raised in emergencies. Fair
use is sufficiently elastic given its equitable history to permit librarians to
furnish information to users after a consideration of the traditional four factors, which, post Google, one might conclude should include circumstance
and benefit to the public. The library and archive exception codified in section 108 is and remains narrow but again is a useful device to support providing information to users. Section 108 is not a free pass. Reading of section
108 requires recognition that a library is more than brick and mortar and the
place of the library exists online. Librarians may tailor their responses to the
demands of the emergency using the statutory devices of fair use and the
library exception to effectively limit the hardships imposed by the absence of
information.

